Plaintiff lessee sued defendant lessor's estate for specific performance of an option to purchase contract. The Superior Court of Kern County (California) fixed the price of the property at $ 9,000 and ordered the lessor's estate to perform the contract. The lessor's estate appealed.

Overview

A contract was entered into with the lessor for the lease of real property with an option to purchase. The lease was thereafter assigned to the lessee. The lease provided that upon its expiration, if the parties could not agree to a price and terms, the price and terms would be fixed by arbitration with each party selecting an arbitrator. The lessor's estate refused to appoint an arbitrator after the expiration of the lease. The court affirmed the judgment because (1) the trial court had jurisdiction to decree specific performance of a contract of a decedent during the administration of his estate (2) the assignment of the lease carried with it the option to purchase the land (3) the parties did not intend a formal arbitration, but an evaluation by appraisers whom they regarded as experienced and familiar with the conditions in question (4) the option to purchase, litigation attorney Los Angeles which provided for the appointment of third persons to ascertain the price, was definite enough to give rise to a contract (5) by making the appraisal impossible, the lessor's estate breached the contract.

Outcome

The court affirmed the judgment.

Defendant insurer appealed a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County (California), which, in a jury trial, awarded compensatory and punitive damages to plaintiff insured in a suit for breach of contract and breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing.

Overview

The insurer issued a commercial general liability policy containing a loss of use provision. An employee of the insured stole cash from one of the insured's clients, a credit union. The credit union's fidelity bond holder paid the credit union under the bond and brought suit against the insured asserting causes of action for equitable subrogation, breach of contract, negligence, and respondeat superior liability. The insurer concluded that there was no covered property damage. The court held that the insurer had no duty of defense or indemnity because the term "loss of use" in the policy did not include the permanent loss of property through conversion and the underlying action brought by the fidelity bond holder was for the replacement value of the cash. Loss of use of property was different from loss of the property. Although the loss of use provision was not modified by the term "temporary," the impermanent nature of loss of use damages was implicit. Moreover, litigation lawyer California the insurer was not equitably estopped from denying coverage based upon not having explicitly mentioned loss of use in its denial letters. Estoppel could not be used to create coverage that did not originally exist.

Outcome

The court reversed and remanded with directions to the trial court to enter judgment for the insurer.

Appellants, no signatories of a contract that contained an arbitration clause, sought review of an order from the Superior Court of Contra Costa County (California), which denied their motion to compel arbitration of claims related to the contract that were brought against them by respondent, a signatory party.

Overview

The complaint alleged that the nonsignatories, who were shareholders and directors of a dissolved corporation, had improperly dissolved the corporation and distributed its assets. The first cause of action asserted an alter ego theory, and the complaint also contained three statutory claims that made reference to the contract and sought recovery of a sum owed under it. The court stated that there was no persuasive reason why a nonsignatory should be precluded from compelling arbitration if sued as a signatory's alter ego. Because they were sued for breach of the agreement on the ground that they were the corporation's alter egos, litigation attorney Los Angeles the nonsignatories were entitled to the benefit of the arbitration provisions. The court further held that equitable estoppel applied to all causes of action because all of the claims relied upon the agreement. A signatory plaintiff seeking to enforce a written contract containing an arbitration clause could be estopped from denying arbitration as to nonsignatories who were sued as related or affiliated persons with the signatory entity. The nonsignatories were not third parties within the meaning of Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.2, subd. (c).

Outcome

The court reversed and remanded to the trial court for entry of a new and different order granting the motion to compel arbitration.

Appellant male ex-cohabitator sought review of a decision of the Superior Court of Alameda County (California) that awarded respondent female ex-cohabitator temporary spousal support pending trial.

Overview

Respondent female ex-cohabitator and appellant male ex-cohabitator had cohabited for twenty-one years. Respondent and appellant did not believe that a license for marriage was necessary for a lifetime commitment. During the marriage respondent assisted in maintaining the family while appellant finished law school and did well economically. The couple had joint ownership of several properties during their cohabitation. Respondent filed a complaint, seeking damages, business attorney following termination of the relationship. The trial court awarded respondent temporary spousal support pending trial. The court reversed and remanded holding that an award of temporary spousal support could not be justified as a substantive right under the Family Law Act. There was no proof of an implied contract. Nonmarital cohabitation did not confer any special privilege over and above those of other civil litigants.

Outcome

The court reversed and remanded the temporary spousal award to respondent. The court held that nonmarital cohabitation did not confer any special privilege over and above those of other civil litigants. An award of temporary spousal support could not be justified as a substantive right.