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August 8

Sergei Shoigu's visit to Baku amid the worsening situation in the Middle East

On August 6, 2024, the President of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev, received the Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, Sergei Shoigu, who arrived in Baku after negotiations with senior Iranian officials in Tehran. This visit by the Russian Secretary took place against the backdrop of another escalation in the Iran-Israel conflict in the Middle East and expectations of retaliatory actions by Iran.

I. Possible Reasons for the Visit

It is worth noting that although the details of the negotiations were not disclosed by the Azerbaijani side, it later became known from Shoigu's own statements that a number of specific issues were discussed during the meeting. The Russian delegation at the negotiations also included Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Galuzin and Presidential Adviser Igor Levitin. Shoigu himself, in addition to meeting with Aliyev, also met with the Secretary of the Security Council of Azerbaijan, Ramil Usubov.

The visit may indicate at least two things:

  1. Russia wants to check the "southern flank's" pulse in case of urgent scenarios in the Middle East.
  2. Russia wants to ensure that Azerbaijan will not interfere in the conflict on the side of Israel and its allies if the situation in the Middle East spirals out of control.

It is important to state that a hypothetical war between Iran and Israel is currently disadvantageous for the Kremlin, considering the deepening military-technical cooperation between Moscow and Tehran since the start of the conflict in Ukraine. This is also evidenced by the request conveyed by Shoigu on behalf of Russian President Vladimir Putin to the Supreme Leader of Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, asking Iran to "respond with restraint" to the killing of Hamas Political Bureau Chief Ismail Haniyeh and to "avoid civilian casualties in a retaliatory strike on Israel (1) ."

II. Russian-Iranian Information Field on the Visit

After the negotiations in Tehran were concluded and the flight to Azerbaijan was completed, official news agencies/channels in Russia and Iran released statements about the main purpose of Shoigu's visit — to warn Baku against any actions in favor of Israel concerning Iran. However, there is an interesting point to note:

The theme of the "warning" was presented in opposite ways by both Russian and Iranian sources. For example, Russian-Armenian news agencies circulated (2) (3) reports about Shoigu's visit to Baku, citing "Iranian channels close to the IRGC." Meanwhile, Iranian channels close to the IRGC presented (4) this news as being spread by Russian media. This may suggest a certain level of coordination between the relevant state structures of Russia and Iran on this issue.

It is important to emphasize that this information was clearly intended for a wide audience, and it is highly likely that it was initiated by the Iranian side during negotiations with Shoigu in Tehran and subsequently discussed during his meeting with Aliyev.

III. Regional Security Issues

Regarding the topics discussed, in his statement to the media on regional security, Shoigu highlighted (5) the following points:

  1. The peace agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia;
  2. Attempts by the West to actively interfere in the peace agenda.

Given the use of the adjective "active," it is likely that the parties discussed the following events and measures to counter them:

  • The recent Armenian-American military exercises "Eagle Partner" (July 16, 2024 – July 24, 2024) on Armenian territory;
  • The allocation of 10 million euros to Armenia by the EU as part of the "European Peace Facility";
  • The militarization of Armenia by France.

In this matter, it is also about the general cooperation from other regional centers of power, namely Iran and, of course, Turkey. In this context, Shoigu's mention of the "3+3" cooperation format (Azerbaijan – Armenia – Georgia and Russia – Turkey – Iran) once again confirms how the Kremlin envisions the future arrangement in the region.

However, when looking specifically at bilateral Russian-Azerbaijani relations, it is clear that Russia and Azerbaijan will build their resistance to the West in the South Caucasus within the framework of the Declaration on Allied Interaction between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Russian Federation, specifically focusing on articles 5, 6, 7, and 10 of this document (6).

IV. International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC)

During the official meeting and afterward in his statement to the media, Shoigu highlighted the implementation of the North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) as one of the "important" transport projects between Azerbaijan and Russia.

By "implementation," the Russian Secretary likely referred to the construction of the Rasht-Astara section (162 km), which is expected to be operational by 2025 (7).

This section of the North-South Transport Corridor is a key and final uncompleted part of the already functioning Qazvin-Rasht railway within the Qazvin-Rasht-Astara (Iran) - Astara (Azerbaijan) railway line. The mention of this project once again underscores the strong interest of Russia and Iran in their far-reaching geopolitical plans.

Key Points

  • Shoigu's visit will further deepen Russian-Iranian and Russian-Azerbaijani relations, strengthening the concept of regionalism in the South Caucasus.
  • Shoigu's tour to Tehran and Baku signals Moscow's serious intentions, with a clear desire to become a significant player in Middle Eastern affairs, particularly within the geopolitical triangle of "Russia – Turkey – Iran."
  • Shoigu's emphasis on the North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) may indicate that once the Rasht-Astara section is completed, Russia is likely to use this route to transport certain military cargo to Iran through Azerbaijani territory. However, it is still too early to draw conclusions. Nonetheless, it is possible that certain narratives have already been discussed with Baku.
  • Following Shoigu's negotiations, the Azerbaijani government will likely consult with the Turkish side regarding the prospects of the visit, as well as discuss various scenarios for the situation in the Middle East.
  • Azerbaijan is likely to maintain its relations with Israel despite potential pressure from both Russia and Turkey. In this situation, Baku is expected to avoid active involvement in extra-regional processes in the Middle East, focusing mainly on the peace process with Armenia and methods of countering Western influence in the South Caucasus.

Alihuseyn Gulu-Zada

08.08.2024


Sources:

1) Putin asks Iran to avoid civilian casualties in Israel response, sources say – https://www.reuters.com/world/putin-asks-iran-avoid-civilian-casualties-israel-response-sources-say-2024-08-06/

2) Шойгу из Тегерана прилетел в Баку и встретился с Алиевым – https://am.sputniknews.ru/20240806/shoygu-iz-tegerana-priletel-v-baku-i-vstretilsya-s-alievym-79156763.html

3) Корпус стражей исламской революции: Шойгу из Ирана направился в Баку, чтобы предостеречь Азербайджан – https://news.am/rus/news/837145.html

4) رسانه روسی:

سرگئی شویگو دبیر شورای امنیت روسیه پس از دیدار با رئیس جمهور ایران به سفر خود به ایران پایان داد و عازم باکو شد. – https://t.me/sarbazane_g/84691

5) Декларация о союзническом взаимодействии между Азербайджанской Республикой и Российской Федерацией – https://president.az/ru/articles/view/55498

6) Железная дорога Решт – Астара позволит увеличить объем транзитных грузоперевозок до 15 млн тонн – https://azertag.az/ru/xeber/zheleznaya_doroga_resht___astara_pozvolit_uvelichit_obem_tranzitnyh_gruzoperevozok_do_15_mln_tonn-2839637