Geopolitical alignment in the South Caucasus in the post-war periodÂ
Introduction
The South Caucasus, a strategically important region, has always been the epicenter of complex geopolitical interactions between major powers. In recent years, particular attention has been paid to the relationship between Azerbaijan and Armenia, which intensified after the end of the Second Karabakh War in 2020.
Thus, despite the intensification of discussions on a peace treaty in the post-war period, tensions between countries continue to persist, and regional security remains precarious, taking into account the generally complicated international system of relations between states in the world.
External and regional actors
The geopolitical situation in the South Caucasus includes the participation of major international and regional centers of power.
Russia
Since the end of the active phase of the conflict in Karabakh to this day, there has been a weakening of the role of Russia, which has always considered the Caucasus as its field of geopolitical interests. The outbreak of the conflict in Ukraine further shifted the Kremlin’s focus from the South Caucasus to its western borders. In May 2024, the last units of the Russian peacekeeping contingent left the territory of Azerbaijan.
Nevertheless, despite the noticeable weakening of its positions and the loss of its former power, Russia still remains a key player in the region and both Baku and Iravan, although not critically, are still trying to prevent aggravation of relations with Moscow.
As for the current policy and attempts to gain a foothold in Azerbaijan, Russian officials periodically voice ideas about opening a Russian consulate in Shusha, the status of the Russian language and schools in Azerbaijan, the transition to payments in national currencies, etc.
TĂĽrkiye
Türkiye, as a close ally of Azerbaijan, continues to exert significant influence in the region. It is Ankara’s role that can be considered the most beneficial from the (military) resolution of the Karabakh conflict. Turkish influence in the region has obviously increased since the Second Karabakh War and Ankara's (diplomatic) support has to some extent become an important element for Baku in its dialogue with Iravan. The signing of the Shusha Declaration on June 15, 2021 de facto gave Turkey the right, in the event of an external threat, to intervene in a hypothetical conflict in order to protect Azerbaijan.
Here, by the way, we should also not forget that significant progress has also taken place in Turkish-Armenian relations, although it is obvious that Ankara will adhere to the opinion of Baku, especially in terms of opening the Zangezur corridor. That is, the Turkish side will continue to actively pursue its line in relation to Armenia and firmly adhere to Azerbaijan.
Iran
Another regional actor is Iran, which after the end of the war tried in every possible way to win dividends for itself. The efforts of Iranian diplomacy, in particular the heads of the Foreign Ministry Mohammad Javad Zarif under the presidency of Hassan Rouhani and then Hossein Amir Abdollahian under Ibrahim Raisi, did not lead to tangible results. On the contrary, Azerbaijani-Iranian relations have worsened (an attack by pro-Iranian groups on the Azerbaijani embassy in London, a terrorist attack against the Consulate General of Azerbaijan in Tehran, periodic threats from pro-Iranian groups against Baku).
This kind of behavior on the Iranian side did not lead to any positive results, and very soon it became obvious to Tehran that there were new regional realities that it was forced to come to terms with. As a result, initiatives were taken within the framework of which relations between the two countries relatively led to stabilization.
An important role here, of course, belonged to the efforts of the late Iranian President Ibrahim Raisi, who died in a plane crash on May 19, 2024, while returning from the opening ceremony of hydroelectric power stations of two hydroelectric power stations on the Iran-Azerbaijan border.
On July 5, 2024, as a result of early presidential elections, following two rounds, an ethnic Azerbaijani, reformer Masoud Pezeshkian, was elected president of Iran. It is too early to talk about his policy towards Baku, but positive trends are already being observed:
On July 15, 2024, the Azerbaijan Embassy in Tehran resumed its activities. Most likely, Iranian-Azerbaijani relations will continue to show trends towards improvement.
Western block
The US, EU and France are also actively involved in diplomatic efforts to promote a peaceful resolution to the conflict. The weakening of Russian influence in the Caucasus has also opened the hands of Western diplomacy. Here, both Brussels and Washington are betting on Armenia as a “player”. In this context, one cannot fail to mention the strengthening of Armenian-French relations in the military sphere, as well as various measures to strengthen interaction between the US-EU and Armenia.
However, the West’s attempt to seize the initiative in negotiations between Baku and Iravan in both the Washington and Brussels formats did not find a response from the parties. The personal efforts of the now former President of the European Council, Charles Michel, failed.
The current situation, however, does not prevent the West from abandoning its attempts to establish itself in the region (through Armenia).
At the time of writing, in the summer of 2024, socio-political changes are taking place in the West.
- The positions of Democrats in the United States and the current administration of current President Joe Biden are noticeably weakening in front of former Republican President Donald Trump. According to most experts and public polls, elections will take place in November 2024. Trump is the one who will win. For Biden, after the debate with Trump, the Democrats are already looking for a replacement and are threatening to cut off funding. A likely replacement in the event of J. Biden's withdrawal from the election race will be Kamala Harris.
- In France, incumbent President Emmanuel Macron miserably lost the parliamentary elections, unexpectedly losing a relative majority to the left-wing New Popular Front bloc led by Jean-Luc MĂ©lenchon. Nevertheless, Macron faces a difficult dialogue with the National Assembly about consolidating forces in parliament and creating a coalition.
Prospects
All of the above processes, of course, so far play into the hands of regional power actors represented by Russia, Turkey and Iran. However, it is already obvious that the next round of diplomatic battles for the South Caucasus is just around the corner, and the current situation is simply a pause to clarify their positions on the table.