Putin's Visit to Azerbaijan: Consequences and Possible Scenarios for the South Caucasus
The visit of the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, to Azerbaijan on August 18-19, 2024, has predictably become the main event of the past week. This article will examine the outcomes and possible scenarios for the development of the situation following the Russian leader's visit.
I. Tension on the Border
Before Putin's visit, the Azerbaijani Ministry of Defense reported shootouts along the unofficial Armenia-Azerbaijan border, particularly in the Zangezur and Nakhchivan directions:
- August 15, 2024, near the village of Ganza in the Ordubad district (1);
- August 16, 2024, around 03:20 in the Sadarak district (2);
- August 18, 2024, around 19:30 near the village of Lyakyatag in the Julfa district (3) and at 23:50 near the village of Zarkend in the Basarkechar district (4).
Additionally, on August 19, 2024, around 09:50, an Armenian Armed Forces quadcopter attempted reconnaissance flights over Azerbaijani Army positions near the village of Brun in the Goris district (5). The Armenian side, in response to these specific details from the Azerbaijani Ministry of Defense, merely issued denials, while Armenian military spokesperson Aram Torosyan once again proposed creating a joint mechanism to investigate ceasefire violations (6). Only the report from August 19, 2024, was not disputed.
II. Context of Russian-Azerbaijani Negotiations
During the visit and the agreements reached between Baku and Moscow, six intergovernmental agreements were signed, covering a wide range of Russian-Azerbaijani cooperation. Key points include: the development of the "North-South" International Transport Corridor (ITC), an agreement between SOCAR and Gazprom to expand strategic partnership, Azerbaijan's decision to become a full member of BRICS, and plans to open a Russian-Azerbaijani university in Baku.
In addition to this, the topic of peaceful settlement between Baku and Irevan naturally drew significant attention in the information space. Notably, in his remarks, Putin officially offered the Kremlin's mediation services in the negotiation track, to which the Azerbaijani side, represented later by Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov, responded that Baku is currently using the principle of direct negotiations but is always open to the "Moscow format" (7). President Aliyev himself expressed his willingness to discuss regional security issues with the Russian side, emphasizing that the stability of the entire South Caucasus region depends on relations between Azerbaijan and Russia (8).
Naturally, the Russian and Azerbaijani leaders also discussed the Armenian-Azerbaijani peace process behind closed doors, the results of which were communicated by Putin to Armenian PM Nikol Pashinyan on August 23, 2024 (9).
III. Russian-Armenian Diplomatic Clash
The topic of unblocking the Zangezur Corridor became one of the key points of the visit. On August 19, 2024, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, referring to the 9th point of the trilateral agreement signed on November 10, 2020, between the leaders of Russia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia, publicly stated for the first time that Irevan was sabotaging the negotiations (10):
– "...it is precisely the Armenian leadership that is sabotaging the agreement, which bears the signature of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan. It is difficult to understand the reasoning behind such a position."
The remarks by the head of Russian diplomacy immediately sparked a response in Irevan. In reply, Armenian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Ani Badalyan said that Lavrov's statement calls into question Russia's constructive participation in Armenian-Azerbaijani relations, once again mentioning the "Crossroads of Peace" project. Specifically, Badalyan claimed that the "Crossroads of Peace" project had already gained wide recognition on the international stage and had been presented to Russian officials on several occasions (11).
In response, on August 19, 2024, Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova stated that this was yet another example of Irevan's official policy of blaming others for its own mistakes and strategic miscalculations. In her statements, Zakharova also revealed some interesting details, directly accusing Nikol Pashinyan of disrupting agreements on unblocking the corridor back in June 2023 (long before Azerbaijan's counterterrorism operation in Karabakh in September 2023 against the remnants of Armenian separatists). Armenia, at the last moment, sabotaged the agreement by demanding that Russian border guards also be stationed on the Azerbaijani side, to which Baku refused. After that, Irevan froze its participation in the working group (12).
Theses and Development Scenarios
- Putin's visit can be characterized as a demonstration of the Kremlin's power and interests in the South Caucasus. In this context, the outcomes of the negotiations and the signing of various intergovernmental agreements once again prove that Russia views Azerbaijan as its main (strategic) ally in the region and relies on Baku to advance its interests in the area.
- The visit signifies an attempt by Russian diplomacy to push Turkey and Iran out of its sphere of influence in the South Caucasus. Russia is also benefiting from the cooling of Azerbaijani-Turkish relations due to recent statements by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan on Karabakh and the internal political uncertainty in Iran, which is intertwined with the conflict between Israel and Hamas.
- Putin's visit reaffirms that Russia sees the unblocking of regional communications in the context of the trilateral statement from November 10, 2020, with exclusive control of the Zangezur Corridor by the FSB of Russia. Moreover, it doesn’t matter how the parties agree or in what format – the Kremlin will strive for sole control of the route to Nakhchivan through Armenia.
- Statements by representatives of the Russian and Armenian foreign ministries once again highlight the worsening relations between Moscow and Irevan. Therefore, the position of the Armenian side is of interest, as it will likely resist any Russian (and even Azerbaijani) proposals by relying on its Western partners. This is clearly evident in the response from Armenian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Ani Badalyan, who mentioned that the "Crossroads of Peace" project had gained wide recognition on the international stage (primarily in the West).
- The partnership agreement between SOCAR and Gazprom, although causing a wave of discontent in Ukraine, is unlikely to lead to any cooling of relations between Baku and Kyiv.
- Azerbaijan's desire to apply for membership in BRICS and its intention to elevate its status in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) indicate that Baku is, at least in the near future, seriously considering alternatives to the European Union ("Eastern Partnership") and is relegating European integration issues to a secondary priority.
1) Naxçıvan istiqamətində mövqelərimiz atəşə tutulub – https://mod.gov.az/az/news/naxcivan-istiqametinde-movqelerimiz-atese-tutulub-52589.html
2) Naxçıvan istiqamətində mövqelərimiz növbəti dəfə atəşə tutulub – https://mod.gov.az/az/news/naxcivan-istiqametinde-movqelerimiz-novbeti-defe-atese-tutulub-52592.html
3) Naxçıvan istiqamətində mövqelərimiz növbəti dəfə atəşə tutulub – https://mod.gov.az/az/news/naxcivan-istiqametinde-movqelerimiz-novbeti-defe-atese-tutulub-52617.html
4) Kəlbəcərdə mövqelərimiz atəşə tutulub – https://mod.gov.az/az/news/kelbecerde-movqelerimiz-atese-tutulub-52620.html
5) Müdafiə Nazirliyinin məlumatı – https://mod.gov.az/az/news/mudafie-nazirliyinin-melumati-52623.html
6) Aram Torosyan (MOD) – x.com/ToroseanAram/status/1825454910558666998
7) Ceyhun Bayramov: Azərbaycan Ermənistanla danışıqlar prosesinə açıqdır – https://azertag.az/xeber/ceyhun_bayramov_azerbaycan_ermenistanla_danisiqlar_prosesine_achiqdir-3142982
8) Prezident İlham Əliyev: Cənubi Qafqazda sabitlik və təhlükəsizlik bir çox hallarda Rusiya ilə Azərbaycan arasında sıx qarşılıqlı fəaliyyətdən asılıdır – https://azertag.az/xeber/prezident_ilham_eliyev_cenubi_qafqazda_sabitlik_ve_tehlukesizlik_bir_chox_hallarda_rusiya_ile_azerbaycan_arasinda_six_qarsiliqli_fealiyyetden_asilidir-3142690
9) Պուտինը խաղաղության պայմանագրի մշակման հարցում Հայաստանին ու Ադրբեջանին աջակցելու պատրաստակամություն է հայտնել – https://armenpress.am/hy/article/1198202
10) Лавров: Трудно понять, зачем Армения саботирует договоренность по Сюникскому району – https://rg.ru/2024/08/19/lavrov-trudno-poniat-zachem-armeniia-sabotiruet-dogovorennost-po-siunikskomu-rajonu.html
11) Լավրովի հայտարարությունը կասկածի տակ է դնում Հայաստան-Ադրբեջան հարաբերությունների կարգավորման գործընթացում ՌԴ կառուցողական ներգրավվածությունը. ՀՀ ԱԳՆ – https://armenpress.am/hy/article/1198010
12) Очередная попытка возложить вину за свои ошибки на РФ: Захарова о заявлении МИД Армении – https://am.sputniknews.ru/20240821/ocherednaya-popytka-vozlozhit-vinu-za-svoi-oshibki-na-rf-zakharova-o-zayavlenii-mid-armenii-79703282.html