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Shifts of meaning of this kind were studied closely by Aristotle in connection with his accounts of the kinds of equivocation or homonymy, and of what we would now call analogous predication. A word can be said to be analogical when its meaning shifts more or less systematically according to context. The kind of analogy most relevant in the context of human affairs is what Aristotle called pros hen homonymy. This is where the various relevant meanings of a word are all relatable to a focal meaning or sense or use, a meaning which picks out a primary or central case of the kind of reality or subject-matter under consideration – focal and central in some context of discourse or inquiry. The non-focal senses and non-central cases can be thought of as secondary because they are immature or deviant or in some other way watered-down instances or kinds of the reality, at least when regarded from some appropriate viewpoint or for some appropriate theoretical or practical purpose. Legal theorists self-identifying themselves as positivist – that is, as opposing what they think of as natural law theory – have paid all too little attention to this aspect of our language and its engagement with reality (and fulfilment). So the entire legal science of a Kelsen will be constructed on unexamined and simplistic assumptions about the univocality of ―law‖ and the supposed need for a single form of norm to correspond one-to-one with the single-feature definition of law as a social order for controlling conduct by threat of sanction.21 And the near-universal hostility of self-identified positivists to the lex iniusta non lex theorem overlooks the multivocality of terms such as ―law‖ and ―validity‖. What is central in one context or for one set of purposes is secondary in another context or relative to other purposes. Hence the complexity of the relations between legal validity and law‘s moral legitimacy, and between legal obligatoriness in an intra-systemic sense and in a moral sense, manifests itself in dual poles of centrality: the technical-legal, and the morally conscientious. But since immoral or amoral projects of law-making and -maintaining are parasitic on the fuller reasonableness of morally just law, it is the latter pole that has philosophical primacy as well as primacy in the conscience of the legislative reformer and (with some added complexities of responsibility) in the conscience of the true (central-case) judge.

Though, as has been said above, law and legal philosophy has a quasi-distinct domain and technical character, the very idea (concept) of law (an idea without which no laws will be made or maintained) is so dependent upon wider principles of moral and political thought and philosophy that neither law nor its philosophy can avoid engagement with the ethical and political issues and challenges of the age. Particular aspects of our law‘s content (including its procedural rules and institutions) can ameliorate, or in other cases harm and exacerbate, our community‘s common good. The legal instrumentarium can, not infrequently, provide an easy route to destructive social changes, as the apparatus of human rights litigation has, in many places, provided an easy route to abortion, euthanasia, damaging immigration, and same-sex ―marriage‖, to the oppression of critics of homosexual conduct, and to other destructive evils. But what social elites desire can very often be achieved without much resort to that instrumentarium, or even in defiance of it.