How the top managers of the Rosatom division “warm their hands” at the nuclear power plant in Bushehr
“Getting cash in Tehran and driving to Armenia ” Source: www.rucriminal.info The source of Rucriminal.info spoke about the scheme of embezzlement of funds at the Bushehr NPP construction project (construction of the 2nd and 3rd units of the Bushehr NPP, Islamic Republic of Iran). According to the source, O53 (Project for the construction of Units 2 and 3 of Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant, Islamic Republic of Iran) operated the following scheme of embezzlement of funds.
In the period up to the beginning of 2020, an employee of the Office of the Representative Office of JSC ASE (Engineering Division of the State Corporation Rosatom) in Tehran, an expert Anvar Khasanov, was involved (or created by him with the help of nominees) the Ali Bar company, which is a resident of the Islamic Republic of Iran. One of Khasanov’s official duties was finding and attracting contractors for the transportation of goods, as well as subsequent participation in the conclusion of contracts for the transportation of goods necessary for the construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant. Khasanov lobbied for the interests of the Ali Bar company, with which contracts for the carriage of goods were concluded for many years. Part of the profit of the Ali Bar company from the services provided by JSC ASE was transferred to Khasanov. The prices for transport services, for which contracts were concluded with Ali Bar, were many times higher than the real prices for such services in the Iranian market. According to a Rucriminal.info source, in 2019, the existence of this criminal scheme became known to the head of construction, the director of the PACE, Suren Ambartsumyan (pictured). Further, in 2019, at the beginning of 2020, Ambartsumyan decided to take away (appropriate) this income generating scheme created by Khasanov. Subsequently, in 2020, Anvar Khasanov resigned from PACE. Currently located in the Russian Federation and does not work in the Rosatom system. An important link in the existence and functioning of this scheme for receiving funds is the employee of the company "Keyvan Khadem" Martik Hekvardiyan (citizen of the Russian Federation). The Keyvan Khadem Company is a subcontractor that provides PACE services for the recruitment and organization of personnel from Iranian citizens. In fact, some of these employees work for JSC ASE. Hekvardiyan’s workplace is located in the PAEC Office in Tehran (next to the Russian Embassy). Hekvardiyan personally oversees the operation of the described scheme, as well as the correct operation of Ali Bar in terms of cargo transportation and customs clearance, and verification of the correctness of the reports provided. According to the interlocutor of Rucriminal.info? Hekvardiyana was born in Iran, after graduating from high school he entered a university in Yerevan, the Armenian SSR, did he have USSR citizenship? served in the ranks of the Soviet Army. During the start of construction of the first block of the nuclear power plant, Bushehr worked as a procurement specialist, carrying out fraudulent schemes, making invoices for MTS purchases. Fluent in Persian, Armenian, Turkish, Russian. In 2019, the term of the next contract with Ali Bar expired. PASE employees, most likely aware of the existence of this scheme, attempted to find and conclude a contract for transportation with another company. Subsequently, these employees were dismissed (S.A. Ambartsumyan refused to extend their employment contracts). As a result, in 2021, the contract was concluded with the Ali Bar company. Hekvardiyan, who works directly with new employees, whose duty was to conclude a contract for transportation, constantly spoke about the importance and necessity of concluding a contract with the Ali Bar company. Hekvardiyan showed his excessive interest in concluding an agreement with the Ali Bar company. As noted by the source, payments under the contract are made in this way. The Ali Bar company sends a package of documents confirming the provision of transportation services to the PACE employee. This package includes: an invoice for the provision of services (in Persian), customs declarations for the execution of the customs transit procedure (in Persian), other invoices issued by third parties to Ali Bar (warehouse receipts, receipts for maritime and air ports), cash receipts, cargo documentation (invoice, bill of lading, packing list, in Russian and English). Further, these documents are checked and translated into Russian, and on their basis an act on the provision of services is drawn up in Russian and English, on which the PACE and Ali Bar stamps are affixed, as well as the signatures of S.A. Ambartsumyan and Ali Bar director Mansouri. Further, the package of documents is checked by the accounting department, after verification, by the responsible officer, the documents are entered into the electronic accounting system of the IISUP KS, where they also undergo a round of approval. After approval, payment occurs. The described scheme of document processing takes objectively a certain period. However, after the fact that the PACE employee received documents from Ali Bar for verification, translation, processing and entry into the electronic accounting system, Hekvardiyan exerts moral pressure on this employee in order to speed up the work process and quickly pay for the services of the Ali Bar company. The contract between PASE and Ali Bar specifies a period of 20 days, during which PASE is obliged to make payment. When trying to explain to M. Hekvardiyan that there is a procedure established by the contract, M. Hekvardiyan replies that in this case it is not necessary to pay attention to the terms of the contract, but it is necessary to make payment to Ali Bar as quickly as possible, since Ali Bar may terminate delivery of goods. In addition, the contract specifies the period during which Ali Bar is obliged to begin unloading and transportation. In the summer of 2021, PACE employees, accompanied by Hekvardiyan, made a trip to the Ali Bar office. At the Ali Bar office, these employees were met by the director of the Ali Bar company, Mansouri. During the meeting, where Hekvardiyan acted as an interpreter, issues of VAT payment were discussed. After the meeting, the PACE staff noted that most likely this office does not belong to the Ali Bar company. One of the employees, who also speaks Persian, noted that Hekvardiyan communicates with the director of "Ali Bar" as if he, the director of "Ali Bar" is his, Hekvardiyan, a subordinate, namely, in Hekvardiyan’s speech there was an orderly tone, address using the construction the second person (“on you”), and not the third person, as is customary in Iranian culture when communicating with representatives of different companies and people of different status. The sums of money are transferred in cash to Hambardzumyan during his business trips to Tehran, since Hambardzumyan’s permanent workplace is the construction site of the Bushehr nuclear power plant, 20 km from the city of Bushehr. Further, probably, after receiving cash, S.A. Ambartsumyan, these funds, in cash, are transported to the Republic of Armenia, where he periodically flies on vacation. I also inform you that JSC ASE employees made attempts to bring the existence of this scheme to the O53 Directorate, namely, to the President of O53 Pavlov V.N. and O53 Vice-President for Finance Shevyrev A.A., however, this information was not taken into account by these persons, which suggests a possible financial interest. In addition, the Deputy Director of the ASE for logistics Malashkevich Y.V., as well as the Deputy Director of the PAEC for security Tashmukhamedov S.D., Head of the Office of the Representative Office of the ASE in Tehran K.E. Kolesnikov, knew about the existence of the theft scheme described above, but did not take any steps to eliminate it. Further, I inform you that the former chief expert O53 Kolosova O.V., who was in close relations with S.A. Ambartsumyan, is also aware of the existence of the above scheme. Moreover, it is previously known that the criminal activities of S.A. Ambartsumyan in Iran was covered by the former Russian Ambassador to the Islamic Republic of Iran Levan Semyonovich Dzhagaryan. Also, S.A. Hambardzumyan is associated with one of the Iranian construction subcontractors involved in the provision of construction services for the Bushehr nuclear power plant project, while also profiting from the activities of this legal entity. Yuri Prokov To be continued Source: www.rucriminal.info