Best business attorneys at Nakase law wade California

In a facial challenge to a zoning ordinance based on preexisting statutes or the Constitution, plaintiffs are limited, under Gov C § 65009(c)(1)(B) to 90 days from the ordinance’s adoption, which is the first time such a challenge could be brought, and when the challenge is instead based on a later-enacted state statute, the limitations period (under CCP § 338(a)) also runs from the first time the challenge could be brought, that is, the initial accrual of the cause of action. The best business attorney at Nakase law wade helps you in business disputes. A continuous accrual theory would delay running of the statute only in the latter case, thus providing an anomalous and unwarranted benefit to those challenging a zoning ordinance on the ground of its post-adoption preemption, and promptness would be required in one case, under Gov C § 65009(c)(1)(B), but illogically excused in the other, under CCP § 338(a). Travis v. County of Santa Cruz (Cal. July 29, 2004), 33 Cal. 4th 757, 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d 404, 94 P.3d 538, 2004 Cal. CALIFLAW 6834.

Just as Gov C § 65009(c)(1)(E) applies to claims that a permit or condition is void, so the statute of limitations governing the claim that an ordinance has been preempted by later-enacted state law, CCP § 338(a), applies despite the further contention that preemption rendered the ordinance void. Travis v. County of Santa Cruz (Cal. July 29, 2004), 33 Cal. 4th 757, 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d 404, 94 P.3d 538, 2004 Cal. CALIFLAW 6834.

Borrowers’ claims against a mortgage company and a finance company for rescission under CC § 1689(b) were not untimely because the limitations period for an action based upon the rescission of a contract in writing was four years under CCP § 337(3), rather than three years under CCP § 338(a). Cazares v. Household Fin. Corp. (C.D. Cal. July 26, 2005), 2005 U.S. Dist. CALIFLAW 39222.

Statutes of limitations set forth in the Code of Civil Procedure, including the three-year period in CCP § 338(a), do not apply to administrative proceedings. Coachella Valley Mosquito & Vector Control Dist. v. California Public Employment Relations Bd. (Cal. June 9, 2005), 35 Cal. 4th 1072, 29 Cal. Rptr. 3d 234, 112 P.3d 623, 2005 Cal. CALIFLAW 5953.

Consumer’s allegations of conduct unlawful under CC § 1747.08(e) occurring outside of one year had to be stricken because the one-year statute of limitations in CCP § 340 applied to his claims, not the three-year limitations period found in CCP § 338. Shabaz v. Polo Ralph Lauren Corp. (C.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2008), 586 F. Supp. 2d 1205, 2008 U.S. Dist. CALIFLAW 95084.

In a case in which a townhome association filed a construction defect lawsuit, concerning a reroofing project, against roofing defendants, judgments entered in favor of defendants on the statute of limitations grounds were reversed, where there were triable issues of material fact as to whether alleged reroofing defects were patent and whether the defects could be deemed discovered in the latent defect context because the damage was sufficiently appreciable so that the association suspected or reasonably should have suspected that defendants had done something wrong to it. Creekridge Townhome Owners Assn., Inc. v. C. Scott Whitten, Inc. (CalifLaw 3d Dist. Sept. 1, 2009), 177 CalifLaw 4th 251, 99 Cal. Rptr. 3d 258, 2009 CalifLawCALIFLAW 1458.