Qora oltinga yo’l || The Road to Black Gold
Yaqin Sharqda ro’y berayotgan taloto’plar fonida, “Ipak yo’li, Dunyoning yangi tarixi” nomli mashhur asardan sizlarga qiziqarli bir parcha keltiray:
“Britaniyaning eng yomon qo‘rquvlari 1951 yil bahorida Majlis tomonidan Mossadeghning o‘zi yangi Bosh vazir etib saylanganda ro‘yobga chiqdi. U darhol Ingliz-Eron (Neft kompaniyasi)ni zudlik bilan milliylashtirish to‘g‘risidagi qonunni qabul qildi. London matbuoti hamda Britaniya Vazirlar Mahkamasi anglaganidek, bu falokat edi. Mudofaa vaziri: “ular bizni xohlagan kuylariga o’ynata olmaydilar’, deb bayon qildi. Agar Eronga ‘bunga yo‘l qo‘yilsa’, deya davom etdi u, ‘keyingi qadam Suvaysh kanalini milliylashtirishga urinish bo‘lishi mumkin’. Zarurat tug‘ilganda, Abodondagi neftni qayta ishlash zavodini qo‘lga kiritish uchun Eronga parashyutchilar tushirish rejasi ishlab chiqildi. Bu orqaga cho’kayotgan buyuk imperiyaning so‘nggi talvasalari edi — o‘zining sobiq shon-shuhratini saqlab qolish uchun jon-jahdi bilan tipirchilayotgan edi.
Mossadegh bosimni yanada kuchaytirib, 1951 yil sentabrida Ingliz -Eron kompaniyasining britaniyalik xodimlariga bir hafta ichida buyumlarini yig‘ishtirib, Eronni tark etishni buyurdi. Buning ustiga, Oyatulloh Koshoniy ‘Britaniya hukumatiga nafrat kuni’ni e’lon qildi. Britaniya Erondagi barcha muammolarning ramziga aylangan, turli siyosiy qarashlarni birlashtiruvchi obraz bo‘lib qolgan edi. ‘Siz britaniyaliklarning qanchalik makkor ekanini bilmaysiz,’ dedi Mossadegh yuqori martabali amerikalik elchiga. ‘Ularning qanchalik yovuz ekanini bilmaysiz. Ular qo‘l tekkizgan hamma narsani bulg‘aydilar.’ Bunday ritorika uni mamlakat ichida nihoyatda mashhur qildi; u xorijda ham tanildi: 1952 yilda u Time jurnali muqovasida “Yil odami” sifatida chiqdi. Britaniyaning vaziyatni qo‘pol tarzda majburlab hal etishga urinishlari foyda bermadi. Ingliz-Eron ustidan nazoratni, shuningdek u keltirayotgan daromadni yo‘qotish xavfi bilan yuzlashgan Britaniya hukumati inqiroz holatiga o‘tdi va Eron neftiga nisbatan embargo uyushtirdi. Maqsad Mossadeghga zarar yetkazish va uni taslim bo‘lishga majbur qilish edi. Eronni mablag‘siz qoldirish tez orada kutilgan natijani beradi, deb hisoblagan Britaniyaning Tehrondagi elchisi ser Uilyam Freyzer: ‘ular pulga muhtoj bo‘lganda, qornida emaklab oldimizga keladilar’, degan edi. Asosiy matbuotda paydo bo‘lgan bunday izohlar Britaniyaning jamoatchilik fikridagi mavqeiga yordam berishi amrimahol edi. Aksincha, ular Erondagi qat’iyatni yanada kuchaytirdi, shunday darajagacha yetdiki, 1952 yil oxiriga borib britaniyaliklar sanksiyalar taktikasining samara berishiga endi unchalik ishonmay qo‘ydilar. Shu bois yaqinda tashkil etilgan Markaziy razvedka boshqarmasiga (CIA) ‘Eron Bosh vaziri Mossadeghni lavozimidan chetlatish bo‘yicha qo‘shma siyosiy harakat rejasi’ni qo‘llab-quvvatlash taklifi bilan murojaat qilindi — boshqacha aytganda, davlat to‘ntarishi uyushtirish. Bu mintaqada muammoni hal etish yo‘li sifatida hokimiyatni almashtirish so‘nggi marta qo‘llanilayotgan usul emas edi… Amerika Qo‘shma Shtatlaridagi rasmiylar britaniyaliklarning taklifiga ijobiy javob berdilar.
Bu mablag‘larning bir qismi poytaxt ko‘chalarida namoyishlar uyushtirish uchun to‘plangan olomonni moliyalashtirishga sarflandi; buni CIAning mahalliy ikki asosiy agenti tashkil etdi. Yana boshqa muhim oluvchilar ham bor edi — avvalo Oyatulloh Koshoniy kabi diniy rahnamolar, ularning manfaatlari fitnachilarning maqsadlariga mos deb baholandi. Musulmon ulamolari Kommunizmning aqidalari va dinsizlik ruhiyati Islom ta’limotiga mutlaqo zid degan xulosaga kelgan edilar. Shu bois CIA ruhoniylar bilan kelishuvlar tuzish uchun aniq umumiy manfaat maydonini ko‘rdi; ularga Kommunistik Eron xavfi haqida qat’iy ogohlantirishlar berildi.”
AQSh (CIA) Mossadeghni — mamlakatda demokratik islohotlar o‘tkazishga uringan shaxsni — hokimiyatdan chetlatib, uning o‘rniga 1950-yillarda ruhoniylar ta’siri kuchaygan tuzumni olib keldi.
With the current Middle East conflicts in mind here is an interesting excerpt from a famous book “The Silk Roads. A New History of the World” by Peter Frankopan:
“Britain’s worst fears were realised when Mossadegh himself was chosen as the new Prime Minister by the Majlis in the spring of 1951. He at once passed a law nationalising Anglo-Iranian (Oil company) with immediate effect. This was a disaster, as both the press in London and the British Cabinet realised. It was important, declared the Defence Minister, ‘to show that our tail [can]not be twisted interminably’. If Iran was ‘allowed to get away with it’, he went on, ‘the next thing could be an attempt to nationalise the Suez canal’. Plans were drawn up to drop paratroopers into Iran to secure the refinery at Ābādān if necessary. These were the death throes of a great empire in retreat, desperately thrashing to hold on to its former glories.
Mossadegh turned the screw, giving British employees of Anglo-Iranian a week to pack and to get out of Iran in September 1951. To top it off, Ayatollah Kashani declared a national day of ‘hatred against the British government’. Britain had become a byword for all that was wrong in Iran, one that united a wide spectrum of political beliefs. ‘You don’t know how crafty [the British] are,’ Mossadegh told one high-ranking American envoy. ‘You don’t know how evil they are. You do not know how they sully everything they touch.’ This sort of rhetoric made him wildly popular at home; it also made him famous abroad: in 1952, he was on the cover of Time magazine as its Man of the Year. Britain’s heavy-handed attempt to force the situation did not help. Faced with losing control not only of Anglo-Iranian but of the income it brought, the British government went into crisis mode, organising an embargo on all Iranian oil. The aim was to hurt Mossadegh and force him to capitulate. Starving Iran of funds would soon have the desired effect, opined Sir William Fraser, the British ambassador in Teheran: ‘when [the Iranians] need money, they will come crawling to us on their bellies’. Comments like these that appeared in the mainstream press were hardly likely to help Britain’s cause in the court of public opinion. Instead they simply strengthened resolve in Iran, to the point that by the end of 1952 the British were no longer so confident that the tactic of using sanctions would pay off. An approach was therefore made to the recently established Central Intelligence Agency to support a plan ‘of joint political action to remove [Iran’s] Prime Minister Mossadegh’ – in other words, to stage a coup. Not for the last time, regime change in this part of the world seemed the answer to the problem… Officials in the United States responded favourably to British overtures.
Some of these funds were spent paying for crowds to march on the streets of the capital, organised by the CIA’s two main local operatives. There were other notable recipients too – above all mullahs like Ayatollah Kashani, whose interests were judged to be mutually compatible with the aims of the plotters. Muslim scholars had concluded that the precepts and anti- religiosity of Communism made the doctrine anathema to the teaching of Islam. As such, there was an obvious overlap for the CIA to strike deals with clerics, who were emphatically warned of the dangers of a Communist Iran.”
The USA (CIA) removed Mossadegh, a person who tried to do democratic reforms in the country and changed him to clerics back in the 1950th.