The Only Easy Day Was Yesterday. Hostomel. Special Unit "Omega"

Interview with a serviceman of the National Guard of Ukraine was conducted for National Information Portal “Tysk” by Serhii Haraluzhiy, Mykyta Korobochkin, Yevhen Motolyhin, Dmytro Temchenko and Serhii Veselukha. Translation by Illia Morozenko.

In memory of our fallen brother, Vyacheslav “Gryvas” Bashta.

Summary:

• What was the level of awareness of the enemy's plans? Did you have any knowledge about upcoming air assault? If so, were you prepared for it?
• What preparations were made for the invasion from Belarus? Were there engineering preparations in the north of the region, any minefields placed?
• The reaction to the outbreak of war, the atmosphere among the commanders at the time.
• Why was the possibility of the beginning of full-scale war denied at all high levels, up to the top leadership of the country?
• Where did the missiles hitting? What measures were taken to minimize the damage from the missile strikes of the first waves? Evaluation of the effectiveness of the first Russian strike.
• What were the overall first actions of the command and troops from the start of the war?
• What was happened to the Chernobyl nuclear power plant? Who was stationed there and what was the fate of the garrison?
• How did the Russians advance in the border zone (Pripyat-Ivankov)? What units were defending there, how many were there? What became of the military who had been defending in the Ivankov area? Is it true that they were able to retreat on foot through the forests?
• Infiltration of Russian groups into Kiev with armored vehicles seized from special operations unit "Omega" with the aim of killing the political leadership of Ukraine.
• Which units, apart from the 4 RRB (3018), 1 RRB (3027) and the Omega, were involved in the battle for the airport? Who initially took the first battle and which unit arrived there to help first?
• Were there towed and self-propelled AA systems on the helicopter route during the landing in Gostomel? If so, how did they perform? If not, how were MANPADS used? How effective did they prove to be?
• Who landed on us? What was the fate of the airborne troops?
• Why were there not enough air defenses in the landing areas? What prevented these areas from being reinforced?
• The landing in Vasilkov.
• Who and how destroyed the An-225 "Mriya"?
• When did the Ukrainian military leave the airfield and the surrounding area?
• The main and most brutal mistakes of the AFU and the RF Armed Forces in the north of the Kyiv region.
• At what point did the Russians finally abandon plans for an air bridge?
• Evaluation of the performance of self-propelled SAMs and S-300 SAMs. At what point did anti-aircraft systems like the Osa and Buk start operating on the line of battle?
• How did the Russians manage to get to the suburbs of Kiev so quickly?
• Russian SRGs in Kiev and the panic surrounding them.
• The departmental affiliation of the captured Russian saboteurs. Who were they exchanged for?
• The most worthy opponent.
• The myth about the weak resilience of the Ukrainian military in close combat. How are both sides doing with it?
• The use of domestic and foreign ATGMs in February and March.
• Old Soviet maps in the Russian Armed Forces.
• Have you ever listened to radio intercepts?
• The incident with the AFU and RF Armed Forces fighters using the same radio frequency. How could this happen?
• Evaluation of the level of assistance of the local population to the Ukrainian military.
• Feedback on the trophy weapons.
• Assessment of losses of the Russian Armed Forces.
• How badly was the Russian Airborne Troops affected?
• Was it reasonable to build defenses along the Teterev and Zdvizh rivers? Why was it not do so?
• Evaluate the actions of the AFU SOF, the RF Armed Forces SOF and Russian separate Special Forces brigades in the battles in the Kyiv area.
• What were the tactics of using tanks in the geographical conditions of the Kiev region?
• How did Ukrainian aviation perform?
• What types of infantry weapons had the most significant impact on the course of combat operations? Is the influence of Western weapons on the outcome of the campaign near Kyiv exaggerated?
• Two words about the NLAWs.
• Ukrainian 203mm 2S7 "Pion" SAU. What is the role of high-powered artillery in the success of the Kyiv defensive operation?
• Evaluating the performance of conventional Ukrainian artillery.
• How significant a role did blowing up the dam near Dymer play in the defense of Kyiv?
• Effects of Ukrainian and Russian electronic warfare systems.
• How did the Bayraktar TB2 UAVs perform in the Kiev area?
• Ukrainian and Russian armored vehicles.
• Russian National Guard vis-a-vis. What can you say about them?
• Initial expectations of a full-scale invasion by the Russian Armed Forces.
• What forced the Russians to retreat from the north?
• The most memorable episode of fighting in the Kyiv region. Russian troops crossing the river in amphibious armored vehicles.
• Reflections on the re-entry of Russian troops into the Kyiv area again and the potential outcome of the battle.
• Portable infantry radars in service with the Russian Armed Forces. How did they perform?
• Illogical actions of the enemy during the Kyiv campaign.

Subscribers' questions:

• Did the "Kadyrovites" take part in the battles?
• Is there any information about the battles in the forests near Novye Petrivtsi?
• Were the remaining World War II fortifications, specifically the Kyiv Fortified Zone, useful?
• Approximately how many flights of Russian transport aviation to the airfield were there? From where did the Russians at Antonov Airport have their main supply line during the last weeks of their presence in the Kyiv region?
• Was there direct fire contact with the enemy? If so, how and under what conditions did it take place?

— Hello! Can you introduce yourself to the readers of our portal?

— Greetings! I won't specify a unit or its number. I am a senior lieutenant of the National Guard of Ukraine, serving in the "Omega" special operations unit. I joined forces in the year 2016.

— What was the level of awareness of the enemy's plans? Did you have any knowledge about upcoming air assault? If so, were you prepared for it?

— The preparations for counter-airborne assault actions of the National Guard began approximately a month and a half before the war, including the joint exercise "Zametil-2022", aimed at repelling an airborne assault of the most probable enemy (well, it is clear who we are talking about). Accordingly, the HQ was aware of the presumable tactical landing at 4 airfields in Kyiv (including the Hostomel airfield), so preparations were made – even at the Hostomel airfield there was stationed an anti-aircraft missile platoon of the 4th Rapid Reaction Brigade (4th RRB), named after Sergei Mikhalchuk (unit 3018). This platoon had two more ZU-23-2 units at its disposal. Plus, the 1st Rapid Response Brigade (unit 3027) designated units for protection of airfields in Kyiv suburbs: at "Chaika" and "Zhulyany". Those units were platoon level and lower, reinforced with two ZU-23-2 units and MANPAD systems "Igla", and a number of vehicles (mainly the "Warta" APCs) and trucks (two and three axle KrAZ trucks). As for our unit, we had exercises to repel an assaulting force delivered by helicopters, but we only learned about the landing at the Hostomel airfield on February 24, because the intel was received in a very limited and dosed manner, including information for the officers.

— What preparations were made for the invasion from Belarus? Were there engineering preparations in the north of the region, any minefields placed?

— Literally a month before the invasion the enemy had already been conducting an engineering reconnaissance along the mouth of the Pripyat river, starting from the city of Chernobyl and ending, perhaps, with the Chernobyl NPP release lake. That is, a sort of "line of interest". Most likely pontoons were being prepared in case bridges were destroyed. That is, our reconnaissance divisions often noticed such engineering vehicles as PMP Floating Bridges, wheeled cars with pontoons, and anchors, because the Pripyat River is rather fast with a swift current and it is difficult to place pontoons there. Also the increased activity of UAVs and reconnaissance groups was recorded. Before the invasion, on the 22nd of February, the forward checkpoint of the border guards left their positions and retreated, splitting into following directions: Benevka, Vilcha and Chernobyl, because the enemy had concentrated quite large forces from three directions. Approximately 30 BTGr (Batalion tactical group is a combined arms unit of high readiness, deployed by the Russian Armed Forces – translator’s note) were attacking from that direction, that is the total number of enemy advancing towards Kyiv did not exceed 20 thousand people. Field hospitals were being deployed, logistics infrastructure was being prepared, the airport in Baranovichi was fully prepared for landing of a large number of IL-76 transport aircraft and for rapid unloading, i.e. there was enough personnel and a sufficient number of transport vehicles (two-axle, three-axle, KamAZ, MAZ vehicles) to ensure completion of logistical tasks. That is, it everything was working for the logistics of the invasion forces in the Kyiv region. The North's engineering preparations on our side consisted of setting up local roadblocks and installing mine barriers in some areas, mainly anti-tank and anti-personnel. All of this was carried out within a relatively short period of time. Besides that, explosives were placed on two bridges: the railway bridge, leading to Pripyat from the northern (Belarusian) bank and the road bridge, located near the village of Chernobyl. All of these bridges had explosive charges on them, but unfortunately, they failed to detonate when the time was right. In other words, when I said "local fortifications" I meant that at that time company company and platoon strongpoints, any kind of dugouts, trenches and caponiers have not been made. That is, no fortification in the classical sense was created. In principle, it was due to the general plan of potential combat operations, which was practiced back at the joint exercise in 2018. Generally, the defence of Kyiv was planned and it paid off, but as with any plan, unpredictable processes occurred that were very difficult to anticipate.

— What was your reaction to the start of the invasion, and how did your brothers-in-arms react? What atmosphere prevailed amongst the commanders at the time?

— Specifically, my reaction was quite calm, because the war itself, or rather its active phase, was quite expected, and combat operations were not new to me either, because I took part in the Joint Forces Operation (phase of war between April 2018 and 24.02.2022 – translator’s note) in the winter of 2021. And, let's say, the order of things that was formed – it couldn't last and in any case some kind of epilogue to this story had to happen. So it happened in this format. My colleagues, in general, had similar thoughts on the matter. Everyone was mentally prepared for the war and everyone was expecting it. That is to say that there were no people who panicked or had some unhealthy emotions about it. Everyone kept sober mind and understood what they had to do at that moment. There were no lengthy conversations on "pros" or "cons" - everyone was aware of their task, their place and their role in the coming actions that were now taking place. The atmosphere among the commanders was perhaps not the best because, in my view, what was on paper was still slightly different from the objective reality that had emerged on the 24th. Some staff officers were not quite clear about what was going on, it was a real surprise for them and, in a sense, it affected the speed of decision-making in some units. And so, in general - I would like to say that the first week was significantly stressful for the command, because some officers of the territorial command (that is, the operational command of the Armed Forces) were not seen until the end of the campaign near Kyiv - they only appeared after the active combat operations in the territory of the Kyiv region were over. So there is a very ambiguous situation regarding commanders: we cannot say that all of them were stunned, but we cannot say that all the officers met the beginning of the active phase in their seats either, let's put it that way. So as far as the reaction is concerned, it was generally all right. There was no demoralization, which was heavily reported by Russian telegram channels and in general the news sources, because our enemy had quite expected tactics and for the most part we were ready for the way they were going to act. Therefore, everyone understood everything the way they were supposed to and, so to speak, no words were needed. About the atmosphere: there was an atmosphere of some misunderstanding in the regular units, a little detachment from what was going on, because one of the NGU (National Guard of Ukraine) units had a very serious problem on the 24th, when they received an order to simply go into the forest around their military base and take up a circular defense. That's all well and good, of course, but the circular defence was organized chaotically and was not centralised. The higher-level commanders did not communicate orders to the tactical level officers – some scraps of orders were sent down to battalions and companies rather than complete ones, which ultimately led to their misinterpretation and a couple of very serious mistakes that could have then resulted in serious consequences, but things worked out the way they did and everything turned out fine. I’d like to mention what I was doing on the 24th of February in the first place. On the 22nd, we arrived from the “Zametil-2022” exercise and at the same time we were given the day off. We arrived somewhere in the first half of the day: we handed over the ammunition, loaded the equipment, the so-called debriefing took place with the squadron command and the Territorial Command (TRC – ed.), where there were interesting conversations about the future conflict, or rather the aggravation of the existing one. Most of the people from the TRC, officers with a rank no lower than major, expressed the opinion that there would not be a conflict. That is, they seriously persuaded the unit that there would be no hostilities on the territory of Kyiv, the oblast and in general in the southern parts of our country. Our old-timers who understood the essence of things a little bit, from their own observations, from in other different units, which are engaged in counter-intelligence, foreign intelligence and so on – started to understand then that there was some unhealthy rhetoric to justify the conflict [on the Russian side]/ On the 23rd, I was recalled from my day off. We spent some time in the base and then went home as it was the end of the working day. Of course we stayed longer than necessary and in the evening of February 23rd my girlfriend and I went to a movie and everything was already clear to me: the general atmosphere and general spirit, and some sixth sense was telling me that it would be better if the 23rd had not ended. The next day at 5 am I was informed that a full-scale invasion had begun and I had to get to my unit by any means necessary.

— Why do you think the possibility of the outbreak of full-scale war was denied at all high levels, up to the top leadership of the country?

— I think this information was known to a narrow circle of people and was spread in small portions to units, officers, to some line ministries, and accordingly it simply could not reach some of the officials. Perhaps, sabotage was employed somewhere, i.e. information deliberately did not reach end users – units of tactical level or directly to military units. There is quite a lot of speculation on the subject, but to give a definite answer at this point is impossible because there are too many different sources, and accordingly too much contradictory information on the subject. But personally, my thought is as I said in the beginning: firstly, it is dosed information, i.e. it came in limited portions, incomplete manner, which significantly changed the perception of the situation as a whole; secondly, it was a deliberate failure to give information to officials who should have possessed this information, because the superiors and commanders were interested in not getting hold of it; third, in general, it is reasonable, because dissemination of specific information about the beginning of active combat operations among the military would inevitably be leaked to the civilians and cause panic. That is, the enemy would have been able to postpone their plans for a certain period of time in advance.

— Where did the first wave of missiles land? What measures were taken to minimise damage from the first wave of missile strikes? How do you assess the effectiveness of the Russians' first strike?

— The first wave of missile strikes were aimed at the main and rear command posts, and, of course, at known backup command posts. Their main task was to hit these targets. Further, the missiles were directed against the locations of air defense facilities, i.e. divisions of anti-aircraft systems S-300. They hit the communication centers and command posts of military units. The activities consisted in the fact that deployed ACP (additional command posts) away from the main CP, dispersed communication and control system (incidentally, thanks to Starlink, they managed to create a fairly effective field and operational network of communications). Anti-aircraft missile systems were withdrawn from their bases, and the same was true of ammunition, equipment, and weapons in other units. Within a day or two, everything was brought to the new staging posts as much as possible, and everything was stored there for further use in wartime conditions, for intensive combat. As for the use of enemy aircraft, it was used to suppress the radars and, consequently, the air defenses. To do this, missiles with anti-radar locator system were used. The effectiveness of the first strike, of course, was quite mediocre, because the enemy had not achieved the main objectives of such a strike: command posts were not taken out of action; logistics system was not suppressed; anti-aircraft defense functioned as usual. Well, overall, the tasks continued to be received and continued to be carried out by the units that went on to operate. I would say that the effectiveness of the first strike was extremely low, as for a massive high-precision strike. And in general I would like to point out that most of the missiles simply didn't hit their target, because they had a really wide Circular Error Probable (CEP). Some missiles hit completely wrong targets: for example, on the territory of the military unit where we were at the beginning of the invasion, a cruise missile, which costs some million dollars, flew right into the summer canteen. Well, I mean, fuck, of course it's a very important target to hit it with strategic weapons *laughs*, but shit happens. So the effectiveness of the missile-bombing strike is assessed as unsatisfactory, extremely low. The task was not accomplished, and, consequently, the enemy faced very fierce resistance.

— What were the first actions of the commanders and soldiers in general since the immediate outbreak of war?

— Regarding the National Guard units I can say the following: in Hostomel, the units that remained at the base deployed in combat formation and prepared to defend the airfield. Other units were put on alert and, accordingly, groups of the so-called mobile reserve were formed quickly and attached to the units of the Armed Forces, namely the 72nd Brigade. And then the commander of the brigade distributed the units at his discretion. As for the actions in general, we must specifically speak for different units, because, for example, unit 3066 (27th Separate Pechersk Brigade of the NGU – editor's note) carried out tasks, which were strikingly different from the tasks assigned to the military units 3030 (25th Brigade of Public Security Protection – editor's note), 3027, 3018, 3001 (Northern Territorial Administration of the NGU – editor's note). There were quite a lot of units in Kyiv, not limited to the National Guard. The tasks were different and I cannot say what each rank-and-file soldier did, but as for the units that I know of, the tasks were quite trivial: for example, reinforcing the AFU units in the most breakthrough-dangerous areas. From the beginning of the ground phase, after the airborne assault, the directions of Dymer and, respectively, Kotsyubynske, Irpin, Gorenka, Moschun, Romanovka were reinforced. That is, such potentially dangerous areas where the enemy could put pontoon crossings or organize wading across the river. Accordingly, the plan was such. As for us, we were carrying out various tasks, and we had no common soldiers, because our unit consisted either of sergeants and officers. Our command at that time knew clearly what to do, we were carrying out various special tasks, special reconnaissance tasks, they were quite extensive, so there is a need to go into more detail. The command, perhaps, had its own nuances, so to speak, in the organization of the battle, in the organization of the defense, which resulted in some confusion in the way combat orders that came in, that is, for example, the Special Forces were told to hold the line near Obolon together with the regular NGU units and wait for something. But, of course, there was a certain confusion and disorganization, a rather mediocre level of organization of actions and management of personnel by some commanders, forming a picture in which few understood how to organize those or other types of tactical maneuvers, tasks and the order of their implementation. That is, officers at the tactical level lacked such a basic thing as the ability to plan the actions of units. Not to mention such complex matters as TLP or MDMP (Troop Leading Procedures and Military Decision Making Process – models of military decision making according to NATO standards for below company and higher than battalion levels – editor's note). Even the simple algorithm of decision-making by the commander was absent as such. For the first 3-4 hours, there was a certain chaos in actions and maneuvers which were incomprehensible. Many people barely understood what they had to do – this applies to regular National Guard units, where there were both conscripts and professional soldiers. Situation was better in units, consisting solely from professional soldiers.

— What happened to Chernobyl? What unit was stationed there and what was the fate of the garrison?

— The Chernobyl NPP has been guarded by the unit 3041 (1 separate battalion for protection of especially important facilities – editor's note) since the founding of the internal troops. It is located in the town of Slavutych and belongs to the category of military units tasked with protection of important state facilities. With Chernobyl the situation was such that the garrison had no heavy weapons, and since it was a guard, they had only light firearms (i.e. AK-74), and, possibly, RPK and SVD. In other words, we cannot speak about any supply of anti-tank weapons or heavy weapons. At that time the guard that was there during the assault of Chernobyl NPP was forced to surrender because it was surrounded. According to the information I have from the officers and servicemen of this unit who were able to avoid being captured, two armoured “Tiger” vehicles with SoF units on board drove into the nuclear power plant territory and specific conditions were set: either they would lay down their arms now or they will be destroyed. Since the guard had no right to leave their posts under any circumstances, the men of the Chernobyl garrison were the very first prisoners of war in that conflict. If I'm not mistaken, 141 soldiers of unit 3041 are currently in captivity. I could be mistaken, because I do not remember exact figures and for me this information is quite distant, as some part is very indirectly related. But I do have some data.

We attach the post of Ukrainian paratrooper Vitaliy Voz about the beginning of the war in the Chornobyl zone.

How did it all start for me?

23.02 Exclusion zone
Our Humvee (on the 1st photo) was fully loaded, starting with 7.62 for AK, ending with RPG22 and 12.7 (ammo) for DShK (machine gun). In addition, the commander said to load another 11 pieces of TM 62 – a bunch of anti-tank mines, there was no place to put them. We threw them in the turret to the machine gunner, it was not far to go, he would endure it.
We checked whether the humvee was filled with gas, whether the radios were working, whether everyone was in place and whether we had taken the necessary things (NVs, thermal imagers, batteries, etc.). We were going to one of the checkpoints with Belarus to help the border guards to monitor at night.
To be honest, we did not expect the war to start, we were skeptical. In reality, we thought it was just a muscle flexing exercise, a training that would end in a couple of weeks and we would return to the training ground...
I could not have thought that in 5 hours I would be ordered to set up this mine barrier and put it in a combat position, to hear the alarm in the cities, the artillery coming out of Belarus, shouts on the radio – everything seemed unreal...
The state I felt was uncertainty about what was happening. You think it's a dream, to some extent you experience panic, and at the same time joy. Why joy? Because you are prepared for this for 5 years and you want to apply your skills to the maximum.
@ai__karamba was sitting behind the DSC on a humvee, taking a position shouted to me: "Rudee, we waited for this", we looked each other in the eyes and smiled...

— How did the Russians advance in the border zone (Pripyat-Ivankov)? What units took up defense, how many were there, etc.? What happened to the troops who were defending near Ivankov? Is it true that they were able to retreat on foot through the forests?

— Regarding their advance, it can be said that the main lines of the engagement in the Chernobyl district specifically were at Benevka, Vilcha, Chernobyl ( partially) and the Chernobyl nuclear power plant itself. Units of 80 Air Assault Brigade + unit 3041, two combat groups of special operations detachment (SOD) "Omega" and several units of Border Guard units were present there. There was no task to contain enemy units in the Chernobyl and Ivankov areas. There were, of course, tasks to destroy elements of infrastructure, namely bridges: a road bridge and a railway bridge. For unknown reasons, the bridges were not blown up beforehand, although the real reason was that the offensive was expected at one time but actually happened at another time. That is, the enemy began the offensive earlier than the headquarters had anticipated. In a sense, such an early attack was unexpected for our units. The enemy initially formed an advance group, i.e. 4-5 BTGr (I can't tell the exact number) - with tanks, BMPs, APCs and BMDs. The BMDs arrived a little later (i.e. airborne units) and they had to move on foot as the air bridge operation failed as Hostomel, Vasylkiv, Chaika and Zhulyany airfields were not secure for airborne, or rather for the deployment of military transport planes. This resulted in the landing troops having to move towards Hostomel in ground combat formations. The enemy attacked in two echelons: the first echelon moved to break through, ignoring and bypassing the main settlements and evading the fighting that could delay their advance towards Hostomel. The HQ planned to stretch the enemy's communications through selective strikes on logistics hubs by sabotage groups, SoF and other individual special operations detachments, and consequently disrupt the enemy's communications and logistics, which would have already approached Kyiv directly. I can not name exactly the units that were on the defensive near Ivankov, because by the time all forces retreated from Chernobyl it was a mess, but specifically in Dymer, at the battlefield there were units 3027, 3066, 3030, 72nd brigade, SOD "Omega" and other units of Special Forces such as 140th Special Operations Centre (SOC), Security Service of Ukraine’s (SSU) "Alpha", KORD and other distinguished units. There may have been someone else, but I don't know that. As to the servicemen who were defending the region of Ivankov: the fate is unenviable, most of them were taken prisoner, including the garrison of unit 3041 which was on duty at Chernobyl – they, unfortunately, were almost in full numbers taken prisoner by the enemy. At the moment the fate of prisoners of war is unknown, because there are no contacts that could clarify the status of PoWs of this military unit and, accordingly, their status is unconfirmed. One Omega combat group left on foot because it had to abandon its equipment: two Kozak APCs and one MAZ, which were later used by the enemy for infiltration purposes. There is another point about the advance. The enemy advanced in two echelons: the first echelon advanced towards Hostomel quickly and bypassed the population centres trying not to be drawn into them; the second echelon directly occupied large population centres and erected roadblocks and other fortifications, and so on. In short, it was an attempt at a blitzkrieg.

— Can you elaborate on the infiltration episode?

— During the fighting in the Chernobyl zone, the SOD Omega units left two Kozak armoured vehicles and one two-axle KrAZ vehicle there – with the Guards' licence plates and all the innards. The big problem was that enemies used these vehicles for initial infiltration into Kyiv. Those rumours about how Russian special forces were going to kill Zelensky – yes, it's all true, indeed, these groups entered in trophy cars that were abandoned by our forces. But fortunately, none of the enemy's attempts to eliminate anyone from the higher echelons of power were successful. So we have come to the conclusion that the enemy was indeed in Kyiv, limited groups were present – usually either intelligence or special forces units who were working in the first echelons, or had infiltrated through the network of checkpoints in this way, taking advantage of the general chaos that was going on.

— Which units other than the 4th Rapid Reaction Brigade (RRB) (3018), 1st RRB (3027) and "Omega" were involved in the fighting for the airport? Who initially engaged in the first battle and which unit was the first to arrive there to assist?

— Regarding the fighting at Hostomel Airport. It started for me personally at nine o'clock in the morning, when we arrived at the base (we are based at, say, 3027) and, accordingly, we received the weapons, warmed up vehicles – we had two "Kozaks" and one "Varta". And after that received the mission: we were moving to Hostomel, and there we had to provide direct combat support to units 3018, 3027 and TD (Territorial Defense), to the 140th SOC. Anyway, there were a lot of units, in fact, and since it is impossible to list them all, everyone is trying to claim fighting for Hostomel airfield onto themselves, which is not quite right, because it was a complex operation and a lot of different units from different military and security structures were involved. To say that the SOF carried the Hostomel battle, the National Guard or conscripts shot down all the helicopters – no, it does not work like that. Everything is much more interesting: first the battle itself started when enemy Mi-8 helicopters under escort of Ka-52 attack helicopters approached the runway – apparently they did not expect any resistance, and the first troops landed on the runway. Accordingly, two of the four helicopters that had landed were destroyed by ZU-23-2 guns that had been deployed just beyond the runway in the direction of unit 3018's base and hand-held anti-tank grenade launchers together with small arms fire. There are photos of their wrecks on the internet, they were sprawled out on the runway – it was just the very first landing that took place. Pretty much all of them died; some of the squads had managed to escape under fire, being covered by helicopters that had been hit and the hangar buildings with aviation. The fire was coming from all sides, that is, it was heavy fire and constant. So the first landing was suppressed and I would say defeated. The first battle was fought by us, "Omega", then the units of 3 battalion of Irpin, so called "Irpin" battalion, air defence platoon and logistics company of 3018 – these are the first ones who went into battle. Then the notable units began to join, and let's say it did not happen in stages – there was no single picture of the first, second, third assault, because I told before that on purpose to separate the concepts. For a complete picture, we should say that there was no stopping of the battle – there was no tactical pause in the battle for Hostomel airfield between the first, second and third assault. After the unsuccessful landing on the take-off, enemy understood everything, after which they landed units near Hostomel, to the north of it, on the edge of the forest, and the paratroopers were already moving out in foot combat formations: a chain, diamond-shaped combat formations, so we can't say they were acting unprofessionally, like some people claim. The enemy acted in a well-coordinated manner, had air support, which is important, because Ka-52s had a very serious fire pressure on us during all the battles for Hostomel. This includes firing of unguided aerial missiles, the autocannon, and the use of ATGMs on our equipment. We lost two combat vehicles during the battle for Hostomel, and they were taken out of action by anti-tank guided missiles outside the line of sight. That is, as soon as the enemy helicopters realised that there was already organised resistance here, they were operating from behind the forest edges. In other words, playing a kind of "jumping jack", they flew behind the undergrowth, appeared from behind the forest, dealt a quick blow, went down and then chose the next firing position. The enemy acted competently, coherently. The number one problem that arose in the defence of Hostomel was communication. Unfortunately, National Guard radios operate on high frequencies, we had Motorola, Harris, in general we had a mixed type of radios. The SOF used Harris's exclusively, while units 3018 and 3027 only used Motorola. There were very serious difficulties with communication for obvious reasons. And initially there were attempts of friendly fire, but fortunately because of the experience and professionalism of some units it was possible to avoid casualties among the cooperating units of the 200s and 300s. The second problem is the low supply of air defence equipment. ZU-23-2 had no ammo and had to be rearmed later, and the conscripts got ammo boxes from some stash, and anti-aircraft gunners urgently rearmed them – well, this is ridiculous. MANPADS were only available to 3018, that is, it took time to first find them, then they were brought into fighting position – well... it was hard enough, let's just say. Regarding defence: there's a lot of people claiming sole participation in the defence of Hostomel airport. There were many units involved in the defence of Antonov airport, and it's kind of hushed up.

— Towed and self-propelled AA systems, were they on the helicopter route during the landing in Hostomel? If so, how did they perform? If not, how were MANPADS used? How effective did they prove to be?

— I would further add to the disadvantages the lack of air defence equipment in sufficient quantities. In fact, there was a situation where, by some miracle, MANPADs were not in our vehicles when we left for Hostomel, because we were told that "guys, you shouldn't take them, everything is there" - this was the first task 200 I received during this war, that is, in the first hours I received task 200, a dumb task that could not be accomplished without these MANPADs. The third problem was that the enemy reached Hostomel airport very quickly with minimal casualties along the way. Yes, the AA autocannons were deployed: for example, at Mezhigir'ya there were several ZU-23-2 squads, MANPADS operators were deployed, and for some reason something went wrong, to put it mildly. I cannot say exactly what happened there because I was not personally present there and only rumours reached me as it all happened, but in fact the situation was such that the air defence did not manage to repel the airborne troops to the full extent, i.e. the enemy was not eliminated in volumes sufficient to terminate the operation. So we had what we had: the landing at Hostomel, the first hours of the battle (up to 12 pm) and then we got what we had. If there were ZU-23-2s, they would have torn those helicopters to pieces at such an altitude, most likely, if there was a satisfactory density of fire and a sufficient number of anti-aircraft guns. Unfortunately, the exact route was unknown, so there were probably no AAs there. MANPADs were used in Hostomel – to a limited extent, but they were used. In fact, MANPADs proved quite effective against helicopters, including the attack helicopters Ka-52. It is a good enough thing for countering low-flying, medium-speed targets, and one of the main lessons of this war is that MANPADs have to be necessarily present in the companies, whatever company they may be.

— Who was dropped in our territory? What was the fate of the airborne troops?

— Well, it is clear that airborne units were VDV: The 45th Brigade was, so to speak, the main unit that took part in the air assault. The enemy was planning to land paratroopers on the airfield at Hostomel utilizing the forces of the 45th brigade, to secure the approaches to the airfield and the airfield itself, thus making it possible to land IL-76 aircraft with BMPs and units of other airborne brigades already ready for ground landing. What was their fate? The first landing force was destroyed by approximately 40%, that is, 3 helicopters were put out of action, they were left lying on the runway as carcasses, plus one Ka-52 was shot down (list of objectively confirmed Russian helicopters, destroyed in Hostomel - editor's note). It was shot down using an "Igla" MANPAD. We don't know who the fuck shot it down, because our guys didn't shoot it down, conscripts also said they don't know who shot it down, the 140th SOC also pretended they didn't know, and then they were interviewed and said that "we shot down Ka-52 with MANPADs 'Igla'". When we came out and were angry about it, there was no constructive discussion on this issue. In any case there is a fact, and to appropriate glory is another thing entirely, and I believe it is absolutely irrational now. As to the fate of further landing: the enemy acted professionally, they created quite a serious fire suppression for us, because they were supported by their aviation, on top of that. Around 11 o'clock their field artillery already started to fire. I don't know if it was self-propelled or towed, but because the enemy reached the Dymer line, which they could not break, but they bypassed our main defence lines and came to Hostomel. Accordingly, by 1pm we were already aware that their armour was coming towards us, there was at least a BTGr on the march, which had broken through after all. I did not count how many tanks there were – I saw two and that was enough for me, let's say. We did not have enough anti-tank weapons, i.e. there were no NLAW and Javelin anti-tank missiles as such, there were no Stugna-Ps either.

— Why do you think there were not enough air defence weapons in the potentially endangered areas? What prevented these locations from being reinforced?

— The problem is that the senior leadership did not really seriously consider the possibility of carrying out a real air assault on critical infrastructure such as military and civilian airfields, well, or a dual purpose. Accordingly, with this turned out such a fucking funny situation, I would say that the enemy knew that we were skeptical about such options and hit exactly where we expected, but not so seriously. But in addition the units of m/hr 3027 were responsible for the airfields, and there the staffing was mainly composed of conscripts, the number of contract servicemen was minimal. The enemy knew about the real state of things in the units which were responsible for protecting the airfield. They knew that 4th RRB was on rotation and was well aware of the conditions that had developed by the 24th February. Additionally, I believe that a very big blunder by the HQ was that the enemy was underestimated.

— Was there a plan to drop VDV troops with IL-76's in Vasylkiv?

— That was planned, but it could not take place because the enemy did not occupy the airport with a tactical landing and could not secure the landing of military transport aircraft IL-76 and so on.

— But were there some battles, or was it our troops fighting with each other?

— Yes, but it was not paratroopers, it was groups that came in from the side of Brovary, from the north-eastern flank. The fighting for Vasylkiv would have been the case if the same trick that was used on Hostomel had been pulled there. This is their tactic in general: they use troop transport helicopters to land stormtroopers, they drop elite units, they secure the runway and prepare to meet the military transport planes. It is a very complicated operation from the tactical and timing point of view, because all the logistical and timing issues have to be clearly defined so that there is no delay, because if the ILs are late, an enemy counterattack will most likely crush the landing that has secured the airfield – exactly the situation that would have happened in Hostomel if the armour from Dymer had not approached.

— Can you tell us more about the battles in Vasylkiv?

— I do not know the details.

— Who destroyed An-225 "Mriya" and how?

— Our artillery.

— When did the Ukrainian military leave the airfield and the surrounding area?

— Units withdrew from Hostomel airport and the surrounding area by the evening of February 26. Defence along the Irpin River were established and battles were fought in the direction of Bucha and Irpin, i.e. the enemy was breaking through to these cities to either bypass the Irpin bridge and enter Shevchenko Square or bypass Irpin and jump right out at Kotsyubynske.

— In your opinion, what were the main and most gross mistakes made by the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the RF Armed Forces during those days and in general in the north of the Kyiv region?

— For the RF Armed Forces, the most serious mistake was stretching communications and actually conducting a number of operations like a tactical landing, which without proper suppression of air defence was impossible. This is the first mistake. The second one was stretching the communication lines from Belarus mainly through the roads, which in addition were poorly controlled and even uncontrolled in some parts. The enemy did not expect a long phase of combat operations to the north of Kyiv, which obviously resulted in a number of logistical problems and additional difficulties created by our Special Operations Forces units and some Territorial Defense units, who understood the situation around themselves much better. The third and most important mistake was underestimating the enemy. They were counting on units of the AFU (Armed Forces of Ukraine), NGU and other armed formations to flee as soon as they were about to lay siege to Kyiv, but it turned out nothing of the sort and the siege of Kyiv turned out to be quite a serious operational and tactical defeat for the enemy, if not a strategic one. Another mistake was that the enemy was planning to take the bridges by surprise, i.e. their forces were initially stretched along the Irpin River, from the town of the same name to Kotsyubinsky, because there were bridges there. All of these bridges were destroyed as soon as they approached these bridges, that is, they stretched along the river and they did not have pontoon-bridge fleets ready immediately because the first pontoons began to be deployed closer to March. In fact, the enemy got into a two-week break and the fighting was on the opposite side of the Irpin River, i.e. where the city of Irpin, Bucha, Hostomel are. Accordingly, we got such a situation that the enemy very, very quickly tried to adjust their plans to the current circumstances, but they could not do it. Another mistake, in my opinion, is a very bad organisation of the enemy radio communication, communication between the units (in general, it is our problem too, a mutual problem, I would say). The enemy very often could not intelligently coordinate artillery fire, they could not reconnoitre the results of artillery shelling or another type of strike, and consequently there were difficulties in destroying our forces, because during the campaign near Kyiv losses of the AFU, the NGU were quite small, if assessed competently. I mean using sources in the Armed Forces, in the National Guard, in other armed formations directly and open sources like Oryx.

Our major mistakes in some sense overlap with the Russians, i.e. we have underestimated them, we have made very big mistakes in timing, because we were expecting the enemy on February 23rd, nothing happened on the 23rd and accordingly what? Everybody relaxed. And on the 24th everything fucked up. That's how unpleasant the situation was. The organisation of communication also left much to be desired, in the first days cooperation was organised badly, because there were very frequent cases of friendly fire, getting hit by their own and enemy artillery shells, general confusion and, so to say, slow transfer of intelligence, orders, combat orders from the HQ or from the higher headquarters to the bottom, because there were situations where the lack of communication and so on (Starlink terminals were not available yet in sufficient quantity) operational transfer of information was complicated. Another such significant problem was that some units were de jure combat-ready but de facto there was nothing – this was more about the National Guard.

— At what point do you think the Russians finally abandoned plans for the “air bridge”?

— The moment the first air assault on Hostomel was repelled and the attempted landing on Vasylkiv was stopped.

— How would you assess the performance of the self-propelled SAMs as well as the S-300 SAMs? At what point did air defence systems like the "Osa" and "Buk" start operating on the line of battle?

— Had it not been for the Buk, S-300 SAMs of various modifications, which were in the Vyshgorod anti-aircraft missile division, it would have been very, very bad, as the enemy would have had complete air superiority and they would have done whatever they wanted. Thanks to the fact that the S-300 SAM units were spread out beforehand, at first the enemy aviation could not achieve air superiority and provide support to the landing force that ended up in Hostomel. Their combination of Special Forces+aircraft did not work. "Osa" started to operate around the 25th when enemy aviation was operating on the Irpin-Guta-Mezhigorskoye line. At that time the Osa-AKM SAM system, as far as I know, shot down one Mi-8AMTSh. "Buk"s entered Kyiv somewhere on 27-28th, i.e. the enemy aviation action was almost nullified thanks to the fact that "Buk"/"Osa" appeared. So I want to say that the anti-aircraft missile systems, even though they were Soviet-made, played a pretty serious role in repelling air strikes and destroying cruise missiles and other types of weaponry.

— How did the Russians manage to get to the outskirts of Kyiv so quickly? What do you attribute it to?

— It is simple: they did not stop during the movement, they did not unfold the front line and did not prepare for prolonged battles. And we were bringing their communications and logistics to a collapse, so that we could use the advantage of firepower. There was no other way.

— A word about enemy subversion and reconnaissance groups (SRGs) in cities and the resulting panic. How were the Russian saboteurs operating in reality? From what I know, in the first days Russian saboteurs were conducting sniper fire on NGU military units, can you confirm this?

— No. There was no sniper fire, there was a shoot-out at Petrovka with the NGU unit 3066 (later confirmed as friendly fire), and on the 25th [February] there was a shoot-out near the unit 3030's base in the evening. That one was enemy's fire. Well, there were SRGs themselves. Actually their role is excessively exaggerated. Fear begets fear, as they say. There were many people who really caused a ruckus either out of fear or on purpose (they were spreading false information). Therefore, there were SRGs, yes, but not on the scale and in such volumes as they were described.

— Did the real saboteurs caught belong to any agency? Are you aware of their fate and cases of exchange?

— Yes. They were from Foreign Intelligence Service (FIS, commonlu known as SVR) and Main Intelligence Directorate (commonly known as GRU – translator's note). The last major exchange of Azov fighters to russians was with them. Aviators and SVR/GRU. (This part of the interview was recorded in August – ed.)

— Who was, in your opinion, the most worthy opponent?

— The 45th Brigade, units of the Federal Security Service "A", separate combat groups of various special designation units. And the artillery. 😄

— Russian resources are spreading the information that the Ukrainian military is allegedly unable to withstand close infantry combat and is quickly crumbling down. How is this working out in reality on both sides of the conflict?

— It varies greatly from unit to unit, because there is a very strong difference even between different battalions, companies within the same military unit, brigade and so on. It is impossible to say unequivocally that we are all specialists in close combat to the same extent as it is impossible to say that all units of the Russian army and others like them (collaborators of LNR and DNR) are also specialists in this matter. There are some units that are really good at close combat on their side, i.e. they are people who specialize in assault or urban warfare. We cannot say that they have units which are 100% capable of fighting a proper close combat at 100% efficiency and it will never happen, because a lot of nuances come up when we talk about the moral and psychological state of units and the real level of training of a particular unit. We can say objectively that the units formed from the conscripts will conduct a close combat fight dozens of times worse than any contractual unit of either side. Accordingly, the picture is as follows: mobilized units of the DPR and LPR are not capable of a close combat engagement at distances of 10 to 500 meters, because they have low morale and as soon as they are pinned down by heavy small arms fire, they try to withdraw or simply stop resisting. But the enemy's professional units return fire, maneuver, and move around the battlefield. But there are professional units, which have the same morale as the conscripted ones, they try to avoid the battle, retreat. The enemy is different from time to time: they can be very well trained in urban warfare, such as the Wagner PMC – they go into some settlements in company formations specifically to conduct close-up firefights, they wedge into urban defense of the enemy (that is, us) and conduct an assault action with a number of some engineering-sapper operations and so on. That is, the enemy uses a tactic similar in some ways to World War I: there are so-called assault units, they are specifically designed to hit or suppress our defenses with fire, then regular units are drawn in to reinforce the assault units, solidify their success and carry out a long-term mission, and thus the enemy advances, under cover of artillery fire and tactical airforce. There is another option: with the conscripts I have already told you what happens – they are thrown in waves. A proper full-fledged infantry close combat does not take place. And if they are some specialized units that are designed for assault operations, then yes, of course, they will fight quite well, they know what they are doing, they know their tasks and, accordingly, they are the most difficult opponents. As for us it depends from unit to unit, from unit to unit, from commander to commander. That is, you can take 3018 (4 RRB of NGU), performs combat tasks of different specifics, and people do close combat in a variety of conditions and in most cases come out a winner. I know this clearly because I have classmates who are serving in 3018 as company commanders, deputy company commanders, platoon commanders – they show me all this, tell me about it and I kind of understand what the situation is really like. There are TrO units, that consist mostly of conscripts, and there the situation is similar to LNR and DNR units. It also largely depends on the commander: how he disposes of firepower, how he arranges the system of fire, plans the operation and so on. There are a lot of nuances. As regards the Special Forces units, almost all of our units are capable of prolonged firefights with different units of varying intensities. In this respect the Special Forces are trained very seriously and they really do make a difference. So I think that the generalisation that everyone in our ranks gets scattered by close combat is utter bullshit and nonsense that does not fit with reality at all.

— What do you think about the use of ATGMs in February and March – both domestic- and foreign-made?

— The number and frequency of the use of ATGMs, I think, in this and subsequent periods is staggering. In every infantry unit it was mandatory to have at least a couple of anti-tank missile systems in some variation. We received the Javelin and NLAW anti-tank missiles on the evening of 26th. They were simply unloaded from the transport vehicle and told to use them to their full potential. They were used. The vast majority of the enemy's armored vehicle losses were the result of artillery and ATGM fire.

— Is it true that the Russians were using old Soviet maps and had serious problems because of this?

— We also used general staff's maps of 1990 or even later. That was not the point.

— Did you ever listen to radio intercepts? Was there anything interesting?

— No, I did not listen to radio intercepts and we did not listen to them because we did not have appropriate equipment and signals intelligence (SI) units were farther away from our positions then. There were a couple of armoured reconnaissance vehicles (ARVs), which, in theory, could intercept VHF and SW radio communications, but they were not used because the Russian SI units would probably have immediately identified where these ARVs were standing and they would have been totally fucked up. So, no, we did not.

— To clarify: if you remember, there was an episode near Kyiv, where I think they published a radio intercept between our fighter and a tanker, where the Russians were holding a circle defence, to which our fighters said "surrender at once". How do you think this could happen, that they reached out to our frequency?

— It is quite possible that there can be a situation, when some – both ours and enemy units – were using radios of the same manufacturer and with the same frequency modulation. It's Baofeng – these are the crappy radios, they were often encountered. The enemy had no Motorola at all, Harris – well, there is nothing to comment on. Aselsans, which were installed on our tanks, did not appear on the enemy's side either, so the only options were either Baofengs or cheap Chinese civilian radios, which are were used by both sides.

— How would you assess the level of assistance of the local population to the military?

— The level of interaction between the local population and the military was quite high. Indeed, if there was need in any equipment or someone needed a ride – locals provided it without too many questions. I appreciate it very much, it helped a lot and those people who remained in the occupied territories were providing information on the location of enemy's headquarters, high-tech equipment (electronic warfare, signals intelligence) and counter-battery radars which were of interest to certain structures. Back then, if you remember, both the SSU and the MDI (Main Directorate of Intelligence of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine) often published photos and technical descriptions of the vehicles they were interested in. It happened quite often and then these objects were pointed specifically – where they were located, where they were deployed and in 99.9% of cases this turned out to be true. The percentage of so-called false information was minimal.

— Can you say something about the trophy weapons? What did you like best and what you did not like?

— We had AGS-40 Balkan, we captured it not far from Irpin, from one of the VDV companies of either 45th brigade or 76th division – well, I don't remember exactly. We used it until it got blown up along with the operator. Then we had the BMD-2, which was also nicked not far from Irpin. Of course, there were RPO-A "Shmel" (rocket-assisted flamethrower with thermobaric warhead – translator's note) and RPG-32s. Of all small arms AK-12 was interesting (then the people who took it away said it was only good for disassembly) to get spare parts). We liked "Shmel" a lot – very good piece of equipment, it can be used to accomplish a variety of tasks. And the AGS we took – there's a more handy tripod, it's lighter and although it was rarely seen, it's a very useful thing. As for vehicles: we had only trophy BMDs, because we had not reached tanks, and if any of our soldiers had captured tanks – we either handed them over to regular units, or left them in the field, because we did not have resources to provide them, unlike mechanized brigades like the 72nd.

— How do you estimate the enemy personnel losses?

— The enemy losses in my sector (Moshchun, Gorenka, Romanovka and part of Irpin – this is about the later stage of the conflict, not about the Hostomel landing) were quite high. The enemy, according to my personal estimates, lost up to 30% of the standard company personnel for various reasons (combat and non-combat losses). In the middle of March there were a great number of non-combat losses from frostbite. The enemy was not prepared for long operations. We inflicted many losses on the enemy during the battles for Moschchun (as it was mentioned in one of the interviews of the SOF fighters) - there were quite heated battles, and on the whole, according to my personal estimation – up to a whole battalion of the personnel was killed by the opposing side (including the operation of installing pontoon bridge to cross to the left bank of Irpin).

— Is there any information as to how many casualties the Airborne Troops in general and the 331st Regiment in particular really suffered?

— I cannot say anything about 331st regiment for sure, because I am not sure if they were its representatives, but in this case VDV in the first stage of the conflict (when there were fights in the outskirts of Irpin and the enemy came close to all the crossings over the river Irpin) was used as an ordinary motorized infantry: they dug trenches, and defended certain positions. So I think because of this use of paratroopers, there were quite big losses in the units – starting from Hostomel airport, where they lost about a company or even two worth of personnel, because when we retreated from Hostomel, the airport was shelled quite heavily by our artillery. So overall enemy losses among paratroopers are quite high. I think that they can hardly be compensated by partial mobilization or something else – the losses are too heavy.

— In your opinion, was it reasonable to build the defences along the Teterev and Zdvizh rivers? If so, why was it not done?

— The point is that the initial plan of the operation implied the deployment of the first echelon of Kyiv's defence along those rivers (i.e. along Ivankov), but some adjustments that occurred – they forced the defence to retreat to the line along the Irpin river. Why was this the case? The enemy launched an offensive earlier than planned. Accordingly, the forces which were defending Kyiv could not deploy along these rivers with the level of losses acceptable for further action. The General Staff at that time and the commanders on the ground understood that the transport leg from Ivankovo to Belorussia was much smaller than from, say, Irpin and Dymer to Belorussia. Accordingly, the deployment of defence along the Irpin line was, shall we say, a deliberate move because everyone was well aware of the level of the enemy's logistical capabilities and tried to play around it. It was fortunate because by the end of March the enemy withdrew [from Kyiv oblast'] not because it made a "gesture of good will" and fulfilled its operational and tactical tasks, but because logistics had exhausted itself and the Belarusian side, I think, was reluctant to allow to take ammunition from its depots, and delivery from Russia to Belarus took some time and logistics simply could not fulfill supply tasks. On top of that SOF and other special designation units were performing certain tasks behind enemy lines, thereby disrupting logistics, which made it impossible to complete the objectives. That is why it did not work out.

— Can you assess the actions of the SOF of both Ukraine and Russia and Russian separate special forces brigades in the battle for Kyiv?

— Yes. I do know about the 140th SOC, the enemy GRU units that operated, I know about the individual reconnaissance platoons/companies of the VDV, the Kadyrov's forces and National Guard of Russia's spetznaz that were operating in the Kyiv region at that time. The actions of the enemy can generally be assessed as confident and professional, but lacking the assertiveness that our units had. That is to say, they tried to engage in close combat at a bare minimum – if they had an opportunity to request artillery or some mortar battery to fire on our positions, they would rather request artillery than go there in person. There were cases when their special forces units (I cannot say who exactly, as we could not identify them) crossed the river and carried out reconnaissance and sabotage activities on our side. They worked quite well as forward spotters: mines and shells hit precisely where they were supposed to after provided adjustments – they were aiming at FOBs and our units that were defending their positions. But they were quickly driven out by our own SOF units, and we, too, were engaged in fighting the enemy's forward spotters. So, saying that they acted with maximum professionalism and were way ahead of our units would be wrong, because our SOF units (and in general all forces) showed a high level of professionalism and even in terms of equipment were way ahead of the opponent, because there were cases when the VDV reconnaissance units (they are considered Special Forces) did not have enough special equipment like NV units and thermal imagers, while our special forces units were in a much better position in this respect. And the enemy's lack of night vision equipment was due to the fact that they may not have been able to use all their skills and abilities, so that was it. Our SOF units performed better than the enemy SOF.

— What were the tactics of using tanks in the conditions of the Kyiv Region geography?

— Tanks were used more as "assault guns". There were no tank duels as such in the Kyiv region, although the only instance when I personally observed a tank vs tank combat was in Gorenka, when a tank platoon of the 72nd brigade entered the village, and engaged two shoot-and-scooting T-72B3s from the enemy's side. The duel ended with our tankers hitting the seventy-two with synchronous fire from two firing positions on the opposite bank of the river – he, it turns out, was firing from the side of the glass factory, where they had a firing position. It was hit, there was no epic explosion with the turret blown off, but by the looks of it, the crew was either badly shell-shocked or some of the fire control system elements were damaged – in general, the tank was abandoned and it stood there until it was towed away the next morning. In general – tanks were used as assault guns, as infantry support, but they were not used as breakthrough vehicles. Basically, either BMPs or BMDs – both from our side and from the enemy's side – were mostly encountered. In the direction of Gorenka-Romanovka-Moshchun, our units mainly used wheeled APCs like those BTR-3Es (I have not seen BTR-4s, but as far as I know, they were there too). Vehicles were used in a very limited and very careful manner.

— How did Ukrainian aviation perform? Do you know of any cases of shooting down enemy planes in aerial combat?

— I cannot say anything about air combat, because I have not personally observed them, but at first our aviation was very active and as far as I know, even several helicopters over Kyiv reservoir were hit by our fighter aircraft. As to the direct support of the ground troops, there were a couple of episodes when our Su-25s performing toss bombing not far from Irpin, but I do not know more details. In any case, our aviation proved to be most effective, at least because it was still alive – at the time of the Kyiv campaign, contrary to the claims of our opponents' Ministry of Defence that we have no aviation and no air defence.

— What types of infantry weapons have had the most significant impact on the course of warfare? Isn't the influence of western weapons on the outcome of the campaign Kyiv campaign exaggerated?

— As for western-made weapons: I first saw such thing as NLAW (well, I have seen it before, I was trained on all kinds of western weapons, including TOW anti-tank weapons) around March 10th – before that we used our anti-tank weapon systems like Stugna-P, "Barrier", "Corsair" and American copy of RPG-7 (PSRL-1), and that was it. And our National Guard anti-aircraft forces made do with either "Igla" or "Strela". So we first saw things like the Stinger sometime in March, around 28th-29th. Therefore I think that the Western models of antitank and MANPADS weaponry have played the significant role, but it was more the knowledge, motivation and desire of ordinary, junior and senior commanding staff to win.

— Well what about the hyped up NLAWs that were also used in the Kyiv area?

— Well this thing is like a crazy woman, because you shoot at an enemy BMD and it targets a fucking "Zhiguli" (soviet-made car – translator's note). That's why it's so fucked up. I won't say that NLAWs are a bad thing, they are quite effective, but the firing that my unit did was not very successful. And it's not because of the low level of professionalism of the ATGM operators.

— I have heard it said that the "Pions" (203-mm self-propelled howitzer – translator's note) saved Kyiv at the start of the war. What do you think of the Ukrainian high-power artillery?

— Generally, Ukrainian artillery, 72 Brigade and its brigade artillery group, artillery of 80 Air Assault Brigade (AAB) showed incredibly strong results, because I know where "Pions" were located (in Devichki) - all these shells flew over my position and I could hear it flying perfectly. At night the situation was as follows: I could hear a convoy coming (at a great distance, but I could hear it because it was big and there was a lot of vehicles) and somewhere in the distance I could hear artillery fire. It is clear that it is not 152-mm, but something powerful. Quiet, hardly audible burst of shells, loads of explosions – and silence. That's it – no convoy anymore. There's a huge fucking flame after 5-10 minutes. So I can say that artillery was doing everything possible and impossible to defend Kyiv. And for the most part, crushed convoys with tank wrecks are all artillery work.

— What about the performance of regular Ukrainian and Russian artillery units? How would you assess their effectiveness?

— I have been in the middle of artillery duels: our crews of self-propelled artillery divisions, towed howitzers (if we are talking about 2A36 "Hyacinth-B"), mortar batteries have shown incredible efficiency and effectiveness. I can tell you from the example of a mortar battery in one of the military units of the National Guard: the guys very quickly learned how to fight, because before that it was mainly firing exercises and, let's say, they had minimal time to deploy – they arrived, fired, left. All this, together with a solid salvo against enemy positions took up to 15 minutes and the return fire came in about 20-25 minutes and then, quite askew – there was a large dispersion and even if the mortar men were on the spot, they would hardly be hit. Again, the mortar batteries from the other side were most likely "Vasilki" (82-mm gun-mortar) or regimental 120mm mortars, there was a wide scattering there. As for the work of large artillery (122, 152), they were firing quite densely, sometimes pretty accurately, but they could not get into a counter-battery fight with our units, because ours were faster, more accurate and, accordingly, the Russians tried to leave the position as quickly as possible, so there is no need to talk about the counter-battery. Although it was present at first. Roughly speaking, two weeks since we were stationed in Gorenka – they regularly played this biathlon there and fortunately our units in most cases won the artillery duel. So I think the effectiveness was extremely high.

— How big a role did blowing up the dam at Dymer play in the defence of Kyiv?

— Quite a significant role, because the enemy found the exact spot on Moshchun that I was talking about earlier. It was a narrow section of the river, so it was a matter of 15 minutes to deploy the pontoon, which they did – the Russians dropped the pontoon under the cover of smoke. Thermal imaging cameras did not see anything, all the optical reconnaissance means and drones were useless. The location of the pontoon was found by a recon unit on foot. It was discovered just outside Moshchun. During the period of 4-6 March there was fierce fighting over control of Moshchun. And if the dam had not been blown up, the enemy could have been deploying the pontoons indefinitely. Well, blowing up the dam widened the river, created a swamp 200-300 meters to the left and right, and just in order reach the river, they had to use the vehicle-launched bridges to pave the way. So it played a very significant role and made it impossible for the forces to cross Irpin.

— Can you say something about the effect of electronic warfare (EW), both ours and the enemy's?

— I have never experienced any problems with radio communication and phones, so I don't know how our and enemy EW equipment worked. Maybe our radios were just very cool and were just outside the ranges of those EW stations, or those were performing completely different tasks for the enemy. I think that they were tasked with covering the headquarters of the enemy groups or some important supply hubs. But I did not experience the effect of EW – no, there was no such thing.

— How did the Bayraktar TB2 unmanned aerial vehicles perform in the direction of Kyiv?

— In general, during the first phase of the conflict (before the enemy realised that UAVs were actually operating here) the Bayraktars were quite effective: both as a standalone combat element (a drone with bombs and missiles) and as an element of a reconnaissance-strike complex. In the first case they actually operated till the end of February, and as an element of RSC – during the entire Kyiv campaign, because there is a powerful enough optical-electronic channel and they easily reached Irpin and Bucha from the outskirts of Kyiv and adjusted artillery fire.

— In other words neither the EW means, nor the air defence systems, which VDV troops had in that region, could counteract in any way?

— No, they could not deal with the UAVs.

— Which Ukrainian and Russian armoured vehicles have you encountered? What can you say about them?

— We have historically had APCs in all of our units – they are "Varta", from the manufacturer "Ukrbronya". "Varta", "Varta-Novator", "Kozaks" of the first iteration (without prefixes) - these are the main vehicles. There were modifications with AGS-17, with ATGM "Barrier" and NSV "Utyos" (12.7mm HMG – translator's note) - there the "sockets" using which those weapons can be installed. The "Kozaks" were equipped with PKM (machine gunner was on the top). Of all this, I was most impressed with the "Vartas" because they were fairly easy to maintain, unlike the Iveco's on which the "Kozak" was based. The "Varta" (based on MAZ 53, I think) is well armored – there were cases where the "Warta" was blown up on the TM-62 (soviet anti-tank mine – translator's note) and not even front axles were ripped out; but of course the engine was ruined and there was nothing to be done in terms of repair there. I drove all 3 vehicles, and the most comfortable to drive was "Varta-Novator": automatic gearbox is debatable decision, but you can switch to manual there; low silhouette (unlike the usual "Varta"); high dynamic performance; good cross-country ability; and, most important, good compartment for additional equipment. We used vehicles for ammunition supply, transporting wounded and as a means of transportation. Can't say anything bad about the "Kozak", either: it really saved lives in many cases of active combat operations in the Kyiv campaign. Concerning the captured armoured vehicles: the only one I ever saw was the KAMAZ Typhoon-K. I do not know its further fate, but in general, as such an APC it was able to perform well enough in these circumstances. It was taken from National Guard of Russian. But in general, Russian armored combat vehicles are not bad, but they are good only because they are made from foreign components, as practice shows. The same Iveco "Rys'" that was involved in the operation near Kyiv were present in VDV units. Well, many have seen trophy "Tigers", but they can hardly be called APC or MRAP, because their protection is only good against small arms firepower. But I have not driven any of the listed Russian vehicles – my experience ends with our MRAPs.

— What can you say about your counterparts in the National Guard of Russia (Rosgvardia)?

— I want to say that these guys were not prepared for war in any way. When they blew up the Hostomel bridge, there were tilt-covered KamAZ trucks loaded with riot armour, aluminum shields for protection, rubber truncheons and all kinds of special equipment like "Cheryomuha" (a chloroacetophenone gas grenade – editor's note) and so on. They were preparing to suppress the social unrest that would result from the overthrow of the legitimate government, but they were forced to resort to military action, they were not expecting that. I want to say that, as practice has shown – their level of combat training was minimal compared to even the Ukrainian National Guard's public security protection units – practice has shown that people in the unit 3030 were able to perform military missions, which the RNG was not able to do. Among the serious units we can mention only some special designation units within the RNG – the same "Kadyrovites" which everyone laughs at, at first they even tried to storm fortified positions on our shore. But mostly there were "astronauts" (slang for riot police related to the outer look of their equipment – translator's note).

— Given your considerable years of service in the military and your corresponding level of familiarity with the internal workings of the Defence Forces, you must have had your own expectations and probable scenarios once the war started. What did you initially expect from a full-scale invasion?

— Based on my skills and understanding of modern warfare, I expected precision strikes on civilian infrastructure: the power plants, the switchyards, the Vyshgorod dam, because if they had hit the dam, it would have triggered a disaster and, shall we say, made it difficult to move Kyiv’s defence forces and assets to the deployment lines – where the organised defence should have been, and the enemy would have been able to rush painlessly and unhindered through Vyshgorod and already be at the gate of Kyiv. I expected that the enemy would still suppress our air defenses more actively in the process, that it would use high-tech weapons against air defenses (we are talking about anti-radar missiles), strike more precisely with missile weapons and in general I expected more aggressive tactics from the enemy. In the later episodes of the campaign around Kyiv (i.e. after Hostomel Airport, when it came to defending Moshchun and Gorenka) the enemy was not overly aggressive, the intensity of close combat fighting gradually dropped and became more of an artillery duel, and in the end they simply could not deliver with logistics, so my expectations were a little more harsh than they actually were – and that's for the best.

— In your opinion, what forced the Russians to retreat from the North?

— First of all, as I have already said – problems with logistics. Second moment – let's say very good operational planning and management of all our troops and units by Syrsky (commander of the forces, that were defending Kyiv – translator's note) and consequently – skill and training of troops, I mean personally: fighters, contract staff and officers – they showed really high level and I think they played big role in success of defense of Kyiv – company, battalion commanders, some special purpose units. And they retreated simply because, to quote the classic, because they got screwed.

— What was the most memorable moment of the battles in Kyiv region for you?

— The most memorable episode of the Kyiv campaign was the night battle in Moshchun, when the enemy somehow (I still don't understand how) crossed the river with armoured vehicles, with the BMD. This is somewhere around March 10th-11th. I don't know about the enemy's night vision devices, but as I understood there was "a ton", because we didn't find any NV devices on any of the fighters. They rolled over with vehicles, with standard armament (apparently, one of the companies crossed the river. But it was incomplete, there were 80-86 people, altogether with the officers). They entered the settlement and began to move swiftly to the south of it, i.e. to the road, which should theoretically lead to Gorenka, and from there to Pushcha-Vodica. We were told about the breakthrough at about half past two in the morning, we immediately set out to the area, walked about a kilometer and then discovered how they were deploying in battle formations. The National Guard units that were in our neighbouring unit in Vyshgorod were already fighting them. Some other units were involved, as far as I understood – Azov, or TD or SOF, I don't know exactly, but some of them. And one of the companies of the 72nd Brigade (5th company?). There were no our armored vehicles, so the advantage was on the side of the enemy, but the enemy had no NV in most cases, so it was some kind of incomprehensible disco: tracers flew somewhere in the air, but targeted shooting was out of the question. Accordingly, we requested an artillery strike – because we knew there was no one in the settlement. With the beginning of the artillery barrage we started using the ATGMs we had (by the way, these were NLAWs), and then from the hill our marksmen started to precisely knock out the enemy with UAR-10s. I suppose that after 20-30 men lost they delved into a total chaos: as soon as they saw that their BMDs were already burnt, they just started running towards the river. Well, while they were running, they all got slaughtered there. The fight was very dynamic, very bright (or so it looked like in the NV device), and so – in the morning there, of course, I saw on video a pile of corpses in Moshchun, the burnt out BMD – these are the results of this fight.

— So it turns out this is the only point where they could use the fact that they have amphibious vehicles?

— Yes. I think they probably somehow found a place for the three BMDs to cross the river.

— Do you think Russian troops will attack Kyiv again? What would be the outcome of that?

— I think it is already useless because of the multi-level defense down to Chernobyl is created; there are clear protocols, clear doctrine how it will be reflected, and now 24 BTGr will not be enough for them, they will need much more, they will need more fire power for our defensive "units", so to say. They won't be able to make such a daring raid again now, roughly speaking (I call what happened not an offensive, but a raid because they stretched their units very hard and fast to certain lines, but failed to secure their rear areas). I think that at the moment without the overwhelming amount of vehicles, personnel and firepower they will not be able to do anything in Kyiv even – even if they bring in Belarus, they will not be able to do anything.

— The Russians have portable detection radars in service (especially in the SOF). Were such radars used in the Kyiv direction?

— Yes, "Fara-1".

— And how did they perform? Were they of any use?

— They did a poor job. Look, think for yourselves: in the West the equipment is 30-40 years newer and more advanced (technology wise) than post-soviet one (since russian military technology does not really exist). Why is that in the West infantry and special forces units do not use ground-based radar reconnaissance stations in the infantry? Yes, because they are ineffective. The radio wave that is there – the width of its range has a huge number of vulnerabilities, including the fact that it bounces off trees very often. And taking into account the density of buildings of Kyiv region: if I sit at the window, the radar will not see me, there will be a wall. The efficiency is extremely low. There may be some sense somewhere in the field, but I think the efficiency is zero. It's easier to buy a decent thermal scope and use it for reconnaissance: it's more compact (because in case of radar, there's a station, you still have to drag it around, it's heavy).

— So only the more serious units had technical equipment at any relatively acceptable level?

— Sort of. I can't say which ones exactly, but as far as I know – Special Purpose Centre "Senezh" was present, but it's just my speculation that it was them.

— About these reconnaissance missions [by Russians], let me ask you: can it be called a reconnaissance by fire?

— Probably it was a reconnaissance by fire, maybe they were forward spotters. Their tasks were unknown to me, in fact, I can only guess. Though there were a lot of illogical actions of the enemy, blatantly illogical – it is hard to explain them.

— Is there an example of illogical actions?

— Stretching communications; send logistical convoys without escort, trucks only: convoys go in marching order, where our SRGs might operate, go without advance guard, without side patrols, i.e. the organization of movement of convoys was about zero. The leading patrol, the so-called forward outpost (which is found in battalion and bigger units), patrols (company and smaller) were very seldom met – all of this was very rarely encountered. In other words, the enemy messed up very basic elements of warfare. I do not know how their officers were trained and in what training institutions, but let's just say they would not have passed the exam.

Subscribers’ questions:

— Did the "Kadyrovites" take part in the fighting?

— Yes, they participated. For the first couple of weeks there were very frequent appearances of Russian National Guard units, which belonged to special designation units, and the "Akhmat" battalion or something like that. Anyway, they were there.

— Is there any information about fighting in the forests near Novi Petrivtsi?

— Yes. It was slightly farther, it was Dymer, and to the left of Dymer the enemy tried to pass our main echelon of defence by forest roads and move directly to Petrivtsy. But it failed, because SOF units were operating there, as far as I know. The enemy was defeated there and they did not try to go around again.

— Were the remaining fortifications from the times of the Second World War, and in particular those of Kyiv Fortified Region used?

— Yes, the pillboxes were used as proper pillboxes with different types of armament and as command posts. Some of them were already in a bad condition, but the majority of them were still usable. They were actively used and it played to our advantage that we had such fortifications on our side.

— Did the enemy during the offensive consider the possibility that you would use these fortifications, or it was a surprise for them?

— I think it was as much of a surprise as the radiation in the Red Forest. *chuckles*

— Approximately how many Russian transport aviation flights to the airfield were there? Where from did the Russians at Antonov airport have their main supply line in the last weeks of their presence in the Kyiv region?

— There were no military transport aviation flights in the form of aircraft. There was a delivery of fuel and weapons by Mi-8AMTSh helicopters, because we could see the Hostomel airport through the optics and there were air approaches. It was also used as an airfield. The Ka-52s that were operating in Moshun, Gorenka, Romanovka – they were temporarily stationed there (they'd land, rearm in 10-15 minutes, and leave).

— That is, the weaponry was delivered by land, and it was armed locally, at the airfield?

— Most likely yes.

— You were talking about Mi-8: so after the first battles they were still flying there for a while, right?

— Yes, they acted as quick logistics.

— Was there any direct fire contact with the enemy? If yes – how and under what conditions did it happen?

— Under different conditions: the enemy was crossing a river and quickly entered a rural area, so it had to be smoked out of there. There were fire contacts at distances of 50, 80, up to 100 m, i.e. close enough – a man's silhouette could be seen. The conditions: in general, close to evening, dusk – i.e. without the NV only the silhouette was visible, and it was very blurred and indistinct. The enemy was behaving uncertainly (most likely they were regular units, reconnaissance or such). They behaved hesitantly in close combat, using defensive grenades and suppression fire – there was no precision fire from the enemy, just a couple of times we met such episodes. So the fire was directed "roughly over there", i.e. in our direction. We, in turn, returned accurate fire, and this in different situations (not always, but in most cases) proved better than just a barrage. Therefore, there was close contact. I believe that the Kyiv campaign, before Mariupol and Severodonetsk, was the most dynamic in terms of close combat.

Aftermath of battle for Hostomel airfield